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This study examined the relationship of pathological (grandiose and vulnerable) 
expressions of narcissism to empathic functioning by comparing performance-based and 
self-report assessments of empathy. Current research suggests that narcissism is related to 
more impairments in affective than cognitive empathy, and that narcissistic individuals 
over-report their empathic capabilities overall on self-report measures because empathy is 
a socially-desirable trait, and they may wish to appear more empathic in order to manage 
the positive impression of others. Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted in an 
undergraduate college sample of eighty-nine participants using a cross-sectional study 
design. It was hypothesized that self-reported pathological (grandiose and vulnerable) 
narcissism would be uniquely associated with better cognitive and poorer affective 
empathy on two performance-based measures of empathy rather than to one self-report 
assessment of empathy when controlling for social desirability. 
Results: Better cognitive empathy on one performance-based task of empathy was 
uniquely related to vulnerable narcissism rather than to poorer self-reported cognitive 
empathy when controlling for social desirability. There were aspects to the results that 
were contrary to expectations. First, poorer (as opposed to better) self-reported cognitive 
empathy was associated with vulnerable narcissism, and this association was explained 
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by lower rather than higher social desirability. Second, while better cognitive empathy on 
one performance-based task of empathy was uniquely related to vulnerable narcissism as 
predicted, this relationship was represented only by the negative stimuli score (for 
negative emotional faces only) of the performance-based task rather than to its global 
score. Post hoc analyses determined that psychopathological (e.g. depression symptoms, 
general psychiatric symptoms, and borderline personality disorder features) and 
demographic (e.g. gender) scores did not account for the association between vulnerable 
narcissism and better cognitive empathy for negative stimuli only on a performance-
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Lack of empathy is a criterion of narcissistic personality disorder in the DSM-V 
(DSM-5; APA, 2013) and is associated with narcissistic personality traits (Ronningstam, 
2016); however, given the multidimensionality of both empathy and narcissism as 
constructs, it has been difficult to pinpoint what a lack of empathy in narcissism means. 
Empathy research across various academic fields has limited its scope by delineating 
three forms of empathy: affective empathy, cognitive empathy, and prosocial concern 
(Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). Though sometimes termed differently, these forms of empathy 
can be defined as vicariously taking on another person’s feelings, thinking about another 
person’s emotions, and wishing that another person’s emotional state will improve, 
respectively (Zaki, 2017). 
The extant research on the topics of narcissism and empathy have determined that 
narcissism is associated with deficient affective empathy, and that cognitive empathy is 
either better, comparable or dysfunctional compared to healthy controls (Baskin-
Sommers, Krusemark, & Ronningstam, 2014). However, studies on the relationship 
between narcissism and empathy have been limited in part by their reliance on self-report 
measures, which have proven to be vulnerable to social desirability biases generally 
(Fazio & Olson, 2003), and for narcissistic patients in particular (Ritter et al., 2011). 
Given that fewer studies have used behavioral measures of empathy to study its 
deficiency in narcissism, the particulars of the relationship remain unclear. Additionally, 
a limited number of studies have examined empathic functioning in vulnerable versus 
grandiose narcissism, two forms of narcissism that have been defined in empirical studies 
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as representing two distinct expressions of the disorder (Miller, Price, Gentile, Lynam, & 
Campbell, 2012; Dickinson & Pincus, 2003; Wink, 1991). 
This study has two major aims. The first aim is to identify if there are unique 
associations between narcissism (including its two expressions, vulnerability and 
grandiosity) and two subtypes of empathy (cognitive versus affective) on two 
performance-based tasks and one self-report measure of empathy. The second aim is to 
identify if narcissism and its two expressions, vulnerability and grandiosity, are better 
characterized by performance-based measures of empathy than by self-report when 
controlling for social desirability. Both of the study’s aims will aid in the diagnosis and 
treatment of narcissism by clarifying what constitutes a lack of empathy in different 
expressions of narcissism, as well as what types of measurements most accurately 

















The term, empathy was coined by the English psychologist Edward B. Titchener 
in an attempt to approximate a definition of Einfühlung, a concept that had been 
developed in the 19th and early 20th centuries within the field of German aesthetic 
philosophy by theorists such as Theodor Lipps (Wispé, 1986). Lipps’ (1903) formulation 
of Einfühlung, which literally means “feeling into,” described the act of projecting 
oneself into another person or environment in order to comprehend the experience and 
feeling of inhabiting a self or place separate from one’s own (Ganczarek, Hünefeldt, & 
Olivetti Belardinelli, 2018). As researchers in the last 40 years have attempted to measure 
empathy as a construct, the number of definitions for it have increased (Cuff, Brown, 
Taylor, & Howat, 2016). Coll et al. (2017) argues that a standard definition of empathy 
emerges from the wealth of research on the construct from the fields of psychology and 
cognitive neuroscience: the adoption of another person’s affective state that causes the 
person who empathizes and the empathic target to experience a similar state. More 
specifically, the person who empathizes is considered empathic if they correctly identify 
and share the empathic target’s emotions. Empathy has also been defined in 
contradistinction to sympathy, which represents a motivational component where a 
person wishes for another’s emotional state to improve (Zaki, 2017). Because studies 
have shown that concern for others predicts prosocial action whereas empathy does not 
(Jordan, Amir, & Bloom, 2016), the study of each construct (empathy and sympathy) has 
largely been kept separate. 
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The aforementioned ability to identify versus share another’s emotions form the 
foundation of two separate but interrelated aspects of the construct: cognitive and 
affective empathy (for a review, see Perry & Shamay-Tsoory, 2013). Affective empathy 
represents the experience of emotion elicited by another person or emotional stimulus, 
whereas cognitive empathy represents the mental recognition and comprehension of an 
emotion (Cuff et al., 2014). When research on empathy was still in its nascent stages, 
there was more of a question as to whether it should be considered a unidimensional 
versus multidimensional construct. According to the unicentric (core dimensional or 
unidimensional) model definition of empathy, cognitive efforts such as those involved in 
imagining another person’s perspective precede affective responses because affect is 
possible only as a consequence of cognitive processes; thus, an affective response may 
happen after the person who empathizes imagines another person’s perspective, or it may 
not (Israelashvili & Karniol, 2018). The multidimensional model conversely posits that 
cognitive and affective processes are separate but related, and that both are fundamental 
aspects of the empathic process (Davis, 1983). 
2.1.1 Subtypes of empathy: cognitive versus affective 
The term, cognitive empathy can be defined as the ability to understand and 
mentally represent another person’s state of mind (Baron-Cohen & Wheelright, 2004), 
and thus shares many features of Theory of Mind, which also includes within its 
definition the understanding that another person has her own intentions or desires 
separate from one’s own (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Affective empathy is the 
emotional response that one person may have in reaction to another person’s emotional 
state, which includes sharing or resonating with the emotions of others (Zaki & Ochsner, 
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2012). Although there is consensus on the position that affective and cognitive processes 
are related, current psychology and neuroscience research have found evidence for the 
assertion that there are two distinct brain systems involved in each process. 
Current research has shown that the two brain systems involved in cognitive 
versus affective empathy consist of different regions, but that these regions are 
neuroanatomically dissociable from one another (for a review, see Marsh, 2018). The 
mentalizing “network” is found to consist of the temporoparietal junction, precuneus, and 
medial prefrontal cortex; these areas are activated when participants are asked to infer the 
mental states of others, whereas watching negative videos yields increased activation in 
the anterior insula and mid-cingulate gyrus (Marsh, 2018). Thus, different areas of the 
brain are activated when an individual sees another person in pain than when they are 
made to more explicitly divine their specific intentions, for example. Developmental 
studies also show that emotional contagion, or the phenomenon of having one person's 
emotions and related behaviors directly trigger similar emotions, occurs in babies, 
whereas the skills required to engage in mentalizing do not develop until a child is 3 or 4 
years of age (de Wall, 2008). Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz and Perry (2009) conducted 
a study in which participants with lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal (VM) or inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG) cortices and healthy controls were given tasks that required them to 
a.) correctly identify the emotions reflected in 52 pictures of different pairs of eyes b.) 
read a story and answer questions to indicate whether they understood the ability of one 
character to represent another’s mental state and c.) complete a self-report, the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index, on different facets of empathy (Davis, 1983; detailed later 
in this document). It was found that the IFG was associated with emotional empathy and 
 
6 
the VM with cognitive empathy; patients with VM damage showed deficits in cognitive 
empathy and theory of mind, but had intact emotion recognition and emotional empathy. 
Conversely, patients with IFG lesions were extremely impaired on the tasks of emotional 
empathy and emotion recognition. This study is one among many fMRI studies indicating 
that different regions of the brain are involved in acts involving emotion recognition than 
in those involving theory of mind (Preckel, Kanske & Singer, 2018; Marsh, 2018; Allen, 
et al., 2017; Eres, Decety, Louis, & Molenberghs, 2015; McCall & Singer, 2013; Hein & 
Singer, 2008). 
2.1.2 Measurement of cognitive versus affective empathy 
Because of the myriad ways in which empathy has been defined, it has proven to 
be a difficult construct to measure. It can be argued that empathy has still not achieved 
construct validity (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955), which reflects the extent to which a test, 
scale or tool adequately measures the construct it purports to measure. The distinction 
between cognitive and affective empathy has provided research on empathy with a road 
map of sorts: by distinguishing between these two distinct but related aspects of empathy, 
measures of the construct have been developed to tap into the two processes cognitive 
and affective empathy each represent. 
Cognitive empathy is often measured by a score of empathic accuracy, which is 
how accurately an individual can identify the thoughts or feelings of another person, or 
“the extent to which such everyday mind reading attempts are successful” (Ickes, 2009, p. 
57). The term, empathic accuracy was first introduced by Ickes, Stinson, Bisonnette, & 
Garcia (1990) in a study that measured it in the unstructured interactions of 38 mixed-sex 
(male-female) dyads; in this study, each member of a couple was instructed to write 
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down their thoughts and feelings in response to a taped recording of them interacting, and 
were then asked to write down what they thought the other person was thinking or feeling 
after viewing the video a second time. Thus, the experiment established a correct 
response (what one person was thinking or feeling initially) that could be matched against 
what the other person guessed, which is how studies measuring empathic accuracy have 
established scores for the construct, whether participants have established their own 
correct responses, or have chosen from a list determined by the task (Zaki, Bolger & 
Ochsner, 2009; Pickett, Gardner, & Knowles, 2004; Simpson, Oriña, Ickes, & Dovidio, 
2003). 
There is some debate on whether affective empathy should be measured based on 
congruency between what a target individual feels and whether the “empathizer” is 
feeling the same emotion; in other words, researchers differ on whether someone is 
affectively resonating with another person if the two affective states are not the same 
(Cuff et al., 2014). Coll et al. (2017) argue that affect sharing should not be based on the 
congruency between the empathizer’s affective response and the target’s affect, but on 
the extent to which the empathizer’s empathic response corresponds to what the 
empathizer believes to be the target’s state, even if the empathizer is not accurately 
identifying what the target is feeling. On the other hand, Hein & Singer (2008) argue that 
the accuracy with which someone identifies another’s emotion is what distinguishes 
empathy from sympathy; when an individual sympathizes with another person, their 
affect is incongruent (e.g., I feel the prosocial desire to help in response to your feelings 
of sadness), whereas empathy implies that an individual feels another’s emotion as their 
own. If Coll et al.’s (2017) argument is given credence, then it suffices to have a measure 
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of affective empathy assess how much the participant empathizes with a target, and not 
measure additionally whether the participant is accurate in identifying what emotion the 
target is experiencing. 
2.1.3 Self report versus performance-based measures of empathy 
The discipline of social-cognitive neuroscience began to influence the 
development of empathy measures starting in the 1990’s by encouraging the inclusion of 
physiological components such as heart rate and skin conductance; however, this 
influence did not curb the development of self-report measures in the field (Neumann, 
Chan, Boyle, Wang, & Westbury, 2015). Many authors of self-report instruments that 
measure the construct of empathy acknowledge that social desirability is a hindering 
factor in the validity of their measures: because empathy is seen as a favorable trait, it is 
reasonable to assume that a participant may over-report their empathic capabilities 
(Vachon & Lynam, 2016; Melchers, Montag, Markett, & Reuter, 2015; Reniers, 
Corcoran, Drake, Shryane, & Völlm, 2011; Spreng, McKinnon, Mar, & Levine, 2009; 
Dziobek et al., 2008; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). Performance-based measures 
of empathy provide fewer opportunities for participants to respond to questions with the 
hypothetical interpreter of their responses in mind.  
Additionally, self-report measures of empathy are not as ecologically valid as 
performance-based tasks (Ritter et al., 2011; Dziobek et al., 2008). This means that in 
order to accurately assess an individual’s empathy, it is important to recreate a real-life 
situation as much as possible. To rate one’s empathy after imagining a scenario based on 
a self-report question is less ecologically valid than having a picture or video presented 
because the participant is relieved of the task of reflecting on their behavior in a 
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hypothetical scenario. Since self-report questionnaires measure how one perceives one’s 
self, while the behavioral measures generally assess abilities, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that studies that employ both self report and performance based measures of empathy 
have found that they do not correlate well with one another (Melchers et al., 2015; Zaki et 
al., 2009). Thus, studies that employ the use of both self-report and behavioral measures 
have the advantage of tapping into the different dimensions of the empathy construct. 
Overall, current research on the study of empathy points to the importance of 
using measures that a.) distinguish affective from cognitive empathy and thus conceive of 
empathy as multidimensional b.) use empathic accuracy to assess cognitive empathy c.) 
are more ecologically valid. 
2.2 Narcissism 
 Narcissism is studied both as a collection of traits and as a clinical disorder. The 
disorder is termed pathological narcissism or narcissistic personality disorder (NPD), and 
is characterized according to the Diagnostic Statistical Manual by a pervasive pattern of 
grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy (DSM-5; 
APA, 2013). In the early stages of its composition, writers of the DSM-5 proposed that 
NPD be removed from the nomenclature in order to decrease the comorbidity of 
personality disorders generally and, in response, researchers cited the prevalence of the 
disorder in order to prove that it should remain included (Levy, Meehan, Cain, & Ellison, 
2013; Trull, 2014). 
In terms of prevalence, social psychology research in the past two decades has 
posited that narcissistic traits and correlates of narcissism have increased in college and 
community samples (Twenge, Miller, & Campbell, 2014). In general, these studies have 
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administered the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979) to 
participants. However, there has been some debate about whether the NPI measures all 
facets of NPD given the fact that it mainly captures the grandiose presentation of the 
disorder (Wright & Edershile, 2018; Pincus, 2013). Thus, the claim that narcissism has 
increased in college and community samples has been disputed (Paris, 2014; Trull, 2014) 
because studies that have reported an increase in the disorder may have only shown an 
increase in one expression of it (grandiosity). Importantly, one of the most recent studies 
analyzing North American university students using the NPI across three decades (1990s, 
2000s, and 2010s) found that there was a significant decrease in narcissism levels from 
the 1990s to the 2010s, and that the traits of leadership, vanity and entitlement showed 
declines in particular (Wetzel et. al, 2017). Studies on the prevalence of narcissistic 
personality disorder show similar inconsistencies, with results showing a range of 
prevalence from 1-6% (Trull, 2014; Ronningstam, 2011). 
 As with the exploration of narcissism’s prevalence, studies on the risks associated 
with narcissistic traits and narcissistic personality disorder remain difficult areas of 
research from which to draw definitive conclusions given narcissism’s limited construct 
validity (Miller et al, 2014). NPD has primarily been researched using clinical case 
reports and psychodynamic theory, while empirical methods have been used to study 
narcissistic traits (Blais & Little, 2010). There is some evidence to suggest that violent 
behavior is associated with narcissism: though NPD diagnostic traits have not specifically 
been found to predict violent behavior, pathological narcissism and low levels of 
empathy in combination have been found to increase the risk of violent behavior and 
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conviction of violent crimes (Lowenstein, Purvis, & Rose, 2016; Logan & Johnstone, 
2010). 
 In terms of psychopathology, narcissistic personality disorder has been found to 
share traits with a few key disorders, some of which are more closely associated with 
psychological risk than narcissism per se. Miller, Lynam, Hyatt, and Campbell (2017) 
examined meta-analyses and expert ratings in order to determine which psychiatric 
disorders have the five-factor model profile that most closely resembles that of NPD. The 
five-factor model (FFM) of personality consists of the domains of neuroticism versus 
emotional stability, extraversion versus introversion, openness to experience versus 
closed, agreeableness versus antagonism, and conscientiousness versus disinhibition. It 
was found that the FFM trait profiles associated with NPD are most similar to that of 
psychopathy, as well as antisocial and histrionic personality disorder.  
2.2.1 Two expressions of narcissism: vulnerable versus grandiose  
 Across the fields of clinical, social, and personality psychology, there are 
consistent descriptions of two expressions of narcissistic pathology: one defined by 
grandiosity, and the other by vulnerability (Cain, Pincus, & Ansell, 2008; Miller & 
Campbell, 2010; Houlcroft, Bore, & Munro, 2012; Miller, Gentile, Wilson, & Campbell, 
2013). The grandiose expression of narcissism is characterized by a wish to be admired, 
as well as self-oriented interpersonal patterns that involve taking advantage of others, 
blaming others for hardship, or generally expecting special treatment (Ronningstam, 
2016). Grandiose narcissists also exhibit the traits of extraversion, entitlement, 
exhibitionism, aggression, and self-importance, and often engage in grandiose fantasies 
(Pincus & Roche, 2011; Lobbestael, Baumeister, Fiebig, & Eckel, 2014; Di Pierro et al, 
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2018). Vulnerable narcissism is conversely characterized by feelings of intense shame 
that often accompany the acknowledgement of one’s own ambition, and interpersonal 
tendencies that are driven by hypersensitivity to threatened self-esteem and the avoidance 
of anything that may endanger self-enhancement (Pincus & Roche, 2011). According to a 
meta-analysis conducted by Miller et al. (2014), vulnerable narcissism, which shares 
qualities with those exhibited by “shy” narcissists (Akhtar, 2000), is associated positively 
with the trait of neuroticism, and negatively associated with agreeableness, extraversion, 
and conscientiousness. It has also been found that vulnerable narcissism is associated 
with introversion, low self-esteem, and anxiety (Wink, 1991; Pincus et al., 2009; Thomas, 
Wright, Lukowitsky, Donnellan, & Hopwood, 2012).  
The criteria for narcissistic personality disorder in the current DSM (fifth edition, 
2013) represent the more grandiose expression of narcissism, which means that key 
aspects of narcissistic pathology are excluded from it (Miller, Lynam, Hyatt, & 
Campbell, 2017). This also means that if a study employs the use of the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-V (SCID), then it must account for the fact that the 
vulnerable expression of narcissism may be missed, and that it may behoove the study to 
use measures that attempt to delineate the two expressions. Crucially, despite the obvious 
phenotypic differences between these two expressions of narcissism, there is substantial 
research to suggest that fluctuations between vulnerability and grandiosity are common 
(Gore & Widiger, 2016; Roche, Pincus, Conroy, Hyde, & Ram, 2013; Ronningstam, 
2009). In other words, a narcissistic individual may oscillate between expressing 
vulnerable versus grandiose traits depending on life circumstances. For example, 
Ronningstam (2016) argues that threats to self-esteem caused by changes in the lifespan 
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(e.g., the move from adolescence to adulthood, or from adulthood to old age) may cause a 
temporary increase in grandiose thinking. These considerations are important for 
understanding the conceptualization of narcissism, particularly as vulnerable versus 
grandiose self-states may affect empathic abilities. 
The data on fluctuations between vulnerable and grandiose expressions within 
narcissism give credence to the conceptualization proposed by Wright & Edershile (2018) 
that vulnerability may represent narcissism at the borderline level of organization. This 
theory is buttressed by research indicating that vulnerability is often associated with traits 
of various DSM personality disorders, as well as with a general tendency to become 
behaviorally dysregulated (Miller & Maples, 2011). Indeed, despite a lack of consensus in 
social and clinical psychology on key issues such as the prevalence of high self-esteem in 
narcissism (Ackerman, Hands, Donnellan, Hopwood & Witt, 2017), research across both 
disciplines has found a relationship between vulnerability and lower levels of 
psychological functioning. For example, in the social psychology domain, it was recently 
found that levels of shame in vulnerable narcissism predicted problem drinking and 
gambling in a non-clinical sample (Bilevicius et al., 2019). In clinical psychology, 
vulnerable narcissism has been found to be associated with higher levels of non-secure 
attachment styles (Dickinson & Pincus, 2003). Recently, Fossati, Feeney, Pincus, Borroni, 
& Maffei (2015) found in a community sample a positive association between adult 
attachment insecurities and PNI vulnerability; specifically, they found that need for 
approval and an anxious/ambivalent and dismissing attachment style were positively 
related to narcissistic vulnerability. In yet another recent study examining the differences 
between vulnerability and grandiosity, self-report data showed that vulnerability as 
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measured by the PNI and the Five-Factor Narcissism Inventory, Short Form (FFNI-SF; 
Glover et al., 2012) was negatively associated with multiple measures of life satisfaction, 
including autonomy, environmental mastery, personal growth, positive relations, purpose, 
and self-acceptance (Kaufman, Weiss, Miller, & Campbell, 2020).  
2.3 Empathy deficits in narcissism 
Within the fields of psychoanalysis and clinical psychology, lack of empathy has 
long been included in the conceptualization of narcissism: Otto Kernberg (1985) 
postulates that narcissistic personalities are self-centered and unempathic in part because 
they have not internalized positive representations of relationships with others, which 
causes them to both dismiss other people’s concerns, as well as seek approbation from 
them. Furthermore, Kernberg posits that the pathological grandiose self develops in 
childhood due to failures in parental empathy as a compensatory effort to combat feelings 
of inadequacy. As a consequence, others are perceived by the narcissist as weak or 
unworthy of empathy in order to bolster the grandiose self (Krizan & Johar, 2012). Heinz 
Kohut (1977), though he differs significantly from Kernberg in his theories on the 
psychotherapeutic technique used to treat narcissism, similarly conceives of the lack of 
empathy in narcissistic patients as a result of their parental figures’ empathic failures: the 
narcissistic child’s longings and desires are not adequately mirrored by his mother (for 
example), and in adult life this deficit manifests in myriad ways, including an inability to 
adequately empathize with others. 




 Recent research on processes of empathy in narcissism has examined behaviors 
related to affective versus cognitive empathy amongst narcissistic patients or individuals 
by using performance-based tasks. Thus far, studies have suggested that narcissism is 
associated with deficient affective empathy, and that cognitive empathy is either better, 
comparable or dysfunctional compared to healthy controls (Di Pierro, Di Sarno, Preti, Di 
Mattei, & Madeddu, 2018; Baskin-Sommers, Krusemark, & Ronningstam, 2014). 
Ritter et al. (2011) conducted a study examining the empathic capabilities of NPD 
patients, healthy controls, and borderline personality disorder (BPD) patients using the 
Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET; Foell, Brislin, Drislane, Dziobek, & Patrick, 2018) 
and the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006). In 
order to measure cognitive empathy, the MET requires participants to view pictures of 
individuals in emotionally charged situations, and asks them to identify the pictured 
individuals’ mental state. To measure affective empathy, the MET also requires 
participants to rate their level of empathic concern for the pictured individuals (Dziobek 
et al., 2008). The MASC is a test of cognitive empathy that requires participants to watch 
a 15-minute movie that involves characters in various social situations, and asks 
participants to answer questions about the intentions and reactions of the characters 
(Dziobek et al., 2006). Results from this study indicated that patients with NPD 
performed worse on the affective empathy portion of the MET than healthy controls, and 
that there was no difference in MET cognitive empathy between NPD patients and 
healthy controls. However, there was a trend towards a significant difference between 
NPD patients and healthy controls on MASC cognitive empathy, with NPD patients 
performing worse in MASC cognitive empathy.  
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In order to test whether those with narcissistic traits are deficient in affective 
empathy, Czarna, Wróbel, Dufner, and Zeigler-Hill (2015) measured community 
members’ level of emotional contagion by asking participants to rate their mood before 
and after viewing three-minute videos depicting emotional situations; these situations 
were developed to induce both positive and negative emotions. According to their scores 
on the NPI, narcissism predicted low emotional contagion for positive emotions, and no 
significant effects were found when testing contagion with negative emotions. These 
findings are in line with another study that examined emotion recognition generally in 
NPD patients (Marissen, Deen, & Franken, 2012), and found that NPD patients 
performed worse on a facial emotion recognition task compared to healthy controls. 
Furthermore, the study indicated that NPD patients were specifically deficient in 
identifying the emotions of fear and disgust. Given that damage to the insula has been 
shown to blunt both the experience of disgust and the recognition of it in facial 
expressions (Baskin-Sommers et al., 2014), these results provide evidence that there may 
be a potential differential between the emotions with which narcissistic patients or 
individuals can empathize. 
Hepper, Hart, and Sedikides (2014) employed a behavioral task to measure 
narcissism and empathy by first administering a self-report of narcissism, the Narcissistic 
Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979), to undergraduate women and then 
showing them a 10-min documentary video describing a woman’s experiences of 
domestic violence. Half of the participants were asked to employ a perspective-taking 
technique as they watched the video in which they imagined how the subject of the 
documentary felt; after watching the video, participants were then asked to rate how 
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much they empathized with the woman in the documentary. Results showed that 
participants who scored high in narcissism on the NPI reported significantly higher 
empathy for the documentary’s subject when they had been instructed to take her 
perspective. These results suggest that with certain interventions that encourage 
perspective-taking, those with narcissistic traits can better engage in empathic processes. 
Besides the behavioral studies described, multiple self-report studies conducted in 
the last decade have indicated a negative association between narcissistic traits and 
empathic concern, emotional empathy, cognitive empathy and perspective-taking (Di 
Pierro, Di Sarno, Preti, Di Mattei, & Madeddu, 2018; Leunissen, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 
2017; Hepper, Hart, Meek, Cisek, & Sedikides, 2014; Vonk, Zeigler-Hill, Mayhew, & 
Mercer, 2013). Using self reports of empathy, narcissism and personality organization, Di 
Pierro, Di Sarno, Preti, Di Mattei, & Madeddu (2018) found that narcissism was 
positively associated with cognitive empathy and negatively associated with affective 
empathy, and that instability of self and other representations mediated the negative 
association between narcissism and affective empathy. Thus, while studies that employ 
performance-based tasks have shown a trend towards weaker abilities in affective versus 
cognitive empathy within narcissism, studies that use self-report alone have shown 
limited empathy is correlated with narcissism more generally. This is in part due to the 
limitations of self-report specifically when examining narcissism, which will be detailed 
below. 
2.3.2 Measurement of empathy deficits in narcissism  
In general it has been found that participants may over-report their empathic 
abilities for reasons related to social desirability (Vachon & Lynam, 2016; Melchers et al, 
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2015; Reniers et al., 2011; Spreng et al., 2009; Dziobek et al, 2008; Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004; Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991). When studying narcissistic 
patients or individuals, however, there is an added risk related to using self-report 
measures alone: narcissistic patients may wish to hide their vulnerabilities, and thus their 
responses on self-report measures may represent an inflated version of their abilities (Di 
Sarno, Di Pierro & Madeddu, 2018; Baskin & Sommers et al., 2014).  
 The aforementioned study conducted by Czarna, Wróbel, Dufner, and Zeigler-Hill 
(2015), which measured community members’ level of emotional contagion by asking 
participants to rate their mood before and after viewing three-minute videos depicting 
emotional situations, found that narcissism predicted low actual emotional contagion of 
positive emotions as measured by their task; however, individuals with high levels of 
narcissism believed that they were more prone to emotional contagion of positive 
emotions according to self-report. Thus, the results on the relationship between 
narcissism and emotional contagion were inversely correlated with one another: while 
participants high in narcissism reported that they could adequately “catch” the positive 
emotions of others via self-report, the implicit task used to measure emotional contagion 
showed that the opposite was true. 
A similar relationship was found in a study conducted by Marissen, Deen, & 
Franken (2012). In this study, healthy controls, NPD patients and a psychopathological 
control group of patients with Cluster C personality disorders were given a facial 
recognition task that required them to correctly identify emotions in pictures that showed 
individuals expressing a range of emotions (e.g., fear, anger, disgust, happiness, and 
sadness). It was found that, compared to healthy controls, patients with NPD were less 
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accurate in recognizing emotional expressions, specifically the emotions of fear and 
disgust. However, on the subscale of affective empathy on the IRI (Davis, 1983), no 
difference in empathic abilities between healthy controls and NPD patients was found. 
Thus, there was a discrepancy between the implicit measure of emotion recognition, and 
the self-reported ability of empathy, which is related to the process of recognizing 
emotions in others. 
  A discrepant relationship between empathy scores on self-report versus 
behavioral tasks has also been found in studies examining the relationship between 
psychopathy and empathy. Kernberg (1985) originally suggested that narcissism may be 
at the core of psychopathy, suggesting a fundamental relationship between the two; for 
this reason, it is relevant to review research studies on psychopathy and empathy in order 
to extrapolate findings relevant to the study of narcissism. In a study examining 
incarcerated men with high and low psychopathic traits compared to healthy controls 
(Pfabigan et al., 2015), participants’ skin conductance responses (an indicator of 
physiological arousal) were examined while they viewed videos of individuals 
experiencing auditory pain. In addition, data on self-reported empathy and participant 
reactions to the videos (e.g., How unpleasant was watching the video for you?) was 
collected. It was found that participants in the high and low psychopathic trait groups did 
experience an increase in physiological arousal, and that participants with low 
psychopathic traits reported significantly high ratings of state measures of empathy. 
Additionally, those in the high psychopathic trait group reported comparable state 
empathy ratings to those of the healthy controls. Thus, there was a discrepancy between 
self-report and physiological data amongst individuals with high psychopathic traits. 
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 Another study examining psychopathic offenders (Robinson & Rogers, 2015) 
sought to identify if individuals with high psychopathic traits would adequately raise their 
cognitive and affective empathy scores on measures of empathy including the IRI (Davis, 
1983) when specifically instructed to do so. In order to measure participants’ ability to 
increase self-reported empathy scores, they were asked to answer questions as if they 
needed to convince a court that they were innocent of a crime. It was found that 
participants were able to significantly raise their cognitive empathy scores on self-report 
measures after instruction, and that affective empathy scores showed a marked increase 
as well. The authors suggest that empathy scales can be susceptible to positive impression 
management, particularly amongst individuals with psychopathic traits. 
2.3.3 Empathy deficits in subtypes of narcissism 
 The research on empathy deficits in vulnerable versus grandiose narcissism is 
limited, and the extant studies provide mixed insight into possible differences in empathic 
abilities between the two expressions. This is in part because the studies that have 
examined the two narcissistic expressions have not always used the same measures. Vonk 
et. al (2013) found that general narcissism and the traits of exploitativeness/entitlement 
and grandiose exhibitionism (traits that are within the subtype of grandiosity) were 
negatively associated with theory of mind, perspective-taking, and empathy; in this study, 
the Pathological Narcissism Scale (PNI; Pincus et al., 2009) was used to measure 
narcissism, and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983) was used to 
measure empathy. Conversely, Ritter et al. (2011) found that patients determined to have 
narcissistic personality disorder on the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-V (SCID) 
were deficient in emotional but not cognitive empathy on the Multifaceted Empathy Test 
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(Foell et. al, 2018), which is a performance-based measure. Thus, both studies found a 
relationship between grandiosity and cognitive empathy, but in inverse directions. 
 Some studies that have explored the relationship between grandiosity and 
correlates of empathy have found an inverse relationship between the two. Miller et al. 
(2013) examined how grandiosity and vulnerability on the PNI relate to participants’ 
scores on the interpersonal circumplex model of personality (IPC), which is a circular 
model of individuals’ relationships with others that groups individuals along orthogonal 
axes of agency (traits that reflect status and power) and communion (traits that reflect 
friendliness and warmth) (Plutchik, 1997). It was found that grandiose narcissism was 
most strongly linked with high agency and low communion, while vulnerable narcissism 
was most strongly linked with low communion. Along similar lines, Lamkin, Clifton, 
Campbell, & Miller (2014) examined grandiosity and vulnerability on the PNI with social 
network analysis, which requires participants to list 30 individuals (alters) perceived as 
most important to them within the past year, and to rate the personality of these alters as 
well as characteristics of the relationships with them, including frequency of arguing with 
each alter, frequency of envying each alter, and frequency of comparing self to each alter 
(among others). It was found that individuals low on grandiosity viewed more central 
members of their networks more positively, whereas those high on grandiosity were 
equally critical of both central and non-central alters. 
Studies that have found a relationship between narcissistic vulnerability and 
empathy have also shown mixed results regarding the relationship between the two. 
Lannin, Guyll, Krizan, Madon, & Cornish (2014) used a mock counseling session in 
order to assess behavior to help a peer under high versus low social pressure, and found 
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that vulnerable narcissism predicted less helping under low social pressure, and was also 
associated with less empathy and forgiveness compared to grandiose narcissism. Given-
Wilson, McIlwain, & Warburton (2011) found a statistical trend short of significance 
between high covert (vulnerable) narcissism and lack of empathic concern and 
perspective-taking on the IRI (Davis, 1983). Miller et al. (2018) used the Levels of 
Personality Functioning Scale (LPF; APA, 2013) in conjunction with the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-V (SCID) to explore empathic deficits in vulnerable versus 
grandiose narcissism, and found that vulnerable narcissism and neuroticism were 
positively related to interviewer ratings of Criterion A personality dysfunction in identity, 
self-direction, empathy, and intimacy. 
Lastly, the most recent study (Luchner & Tantleff-Dunn, 2016) to explore the 
relationship between subtypes of empathy and narcissism found that both cognitive and 
affective empathy on the IRI (Davis, 1983) were negatively associated with vulnerable 
narcissism on the PNI (Pincus et al., 2009). In addition, it was found that higher levels of 
vulnerable narcissism were associated with the personal distress and fantasy subscales on 
the IRI (Davis, 1983). The authors argue that the personal distress and fantasy subscales 
represent maladaptive affective and cognitive empathy, respectively. As a result, they 
posit that the results show how vulnerable narcissists may become more easily 
overwhelmed by others’ emotions because of an unstable sense of self (Luchner & 
Tantleff-Dunn, 2016). However, like many studies examining the subtypes of narcissism 
and empathy, this study is limited by its methodology: because it is a self-report measure, 
the IRI (Davis, 1983) may not be capable of distinguishing between maladaptive and 
adaptive forms of cognitive and affective empathy. 
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2.4 Synthesis of the Literature 
Based on the review of relevant literature to the topics of empathy and narcissism, 
we posit that a.) measures of empathy are valid if they distinguish affective from 
cognitive empathy, use empathic accuracy to assess cognitive empathy, and are 
ecologically valid (e.g. do not rely on self-report alone) b.) neural and behavioral studies 
examining narcissism and empathy show that there may be disengagement amongst 
narcissistic individuals from participation in social processes, including empathic ones c.) 
performance-based studies examining narcissism and empathy suggest that narcissism is 
associated with deficient affective empathy, as well as with increased, comparable or 
dysfunctional cognitive empathy d.) narcissistic patients’ responses on self-report 
measures may represent an inflated version of their abilities, and thus is not an accurate 
way of measuring their empathic capacities e.) there is limited research on differences in 
empathic functioning between the two expressions of narcissism, vulnerability and 
grandiosity. 
Thus, this study has two major aims. The first aim is to identify if there are 
distinct associations between narcissism (including its two expressions, vulnerability and 
grandiosity) and two subtypes of empathy (cognitive versus affective) on two 
performance-based tasks and one self-report of empathy. The second aim is to identify if 
narcissism and its two expressions, vulnerability and grandiosity, are better characterized 
by performance-based measures of empathy than by self-report when controlling for 
social desirability. 
The findings of this study have the potential to provide important methodological, 
clinical and diagnostic insight. Regarding methodology, the study’s findings may further 
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clarify how best to measure empathy deficits in narcissism, specifically regarding the use 
of performance-based versus self-report measures. By including an analysis of empathic 
functioning in the vulnerable and grandiose expressions of narcissism, this study will also 
help identify what features of narcissism should be included in its diagnosis in both 
clinical and research contexts. Specifically, the study may reveal key aspects of the 
vulnerable presentation, and how this expression illuminates the etiology of narcissistic 
disorders that have hitherto been developed in psychoanalytic theory, but have been 
given limited empirical validation. Lastly, understanding how narcissism is associated 
with affective versus cognitive empathy deficits provides opportunities to inform what 



















 A total of eighty-nine participants were recruited via the SONA system at City 
College, which is a web-based participant pool management system that allows students 
to participate in research studies for class credits. Participants had to be at least 18 years 
of age and proficient in English in order to take part in the study. There were no other 
exclusion criteria. In order to recruit for this study, we visited classrooms to inform 
students of the opportunity to participate, as well as posted flyers throughout the CCNY 
campus. Participants could sign up to participate through the SONA website, and 
received a total of 3 SONA class credits in exchange for their time. All recruitment was 
done through the Social and Psychopathology Laboratory at City College. 
3.2. Participants 
Eighty-nine participants completed the study. Of these eighty-nine participants, 
65.2% identified as female (N = 58). The age range of the sample fell between 18 and 36 
(M = 20.66, SD = 3.67). The majority of participants (24.7%) reported an annual income 
of between $15,000 and $24,999. Ethnically, 39.3% identified as 
Hispanic/Latino/Latina/Latinx. In terms of race, 36% identified as Asian, 16.9% identified 
as Black or African American, 11.2% identified as White, 10.1% identified as More than 
one race, 2.2% identified as American Indian or Alaskan Native, 1.1% identified as Native 
Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, and 22.5% indicated their race as separate from the 
aforementioned categories. The entirety of the demographics data is summarized in Table 





  Participants were invited for one session, which lasted between two and half and 
three hours. Identifying information of participants in this study remained anonymous to 
the principal investigator in the following manner: after participants were consented, they 
were assigned an identification number that was attached to all of their data, and their 
name was not connected to their data in any way. After participants were consented for 
the study, they completed two tasks on a computer in the Social and Psychopathology 
Laboratory: the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (Dziobek et al., 2006) and 
the Multifaceted Empathy Test (Dziobek et al., 2008). Taken together, the two tasks take 
about an hour to an hour and fifteen minutes to complete. After the tasks were completed, 
participants were asked to sit at a computer in one of the available booths in the 
laboratory and fill out online self-report questionnaires, which were presented through 
QUALTRICS. The self-report section of the study took about an hour and fifteen minutes 
to an hour and thirty minutes. 
3.4. Measures 
3.4.1 Self-report measures 
Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; Derogatis & Melisaratos, 1983). The BSI  
consists of 53 items that capture nine symptom dimensions: Somatization, Obsession 
Compulsion, Interpersonal Sensitivity, Depression, Anxiety, Hostility, Phobic anxiety, 
Paranoid ideation and Psychoticism. The authors report good internal consistency 
reliability for the nine dimensions, ranging from .71 on Psychoticism to .85 on 
Depression. The BSI also yields three global indices of distress: Global Severity Index, 
Positive Symptom Distress Index, and Positive Symptom Total. These three indices  
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measure current or past level of symptomatology, intensity of symptoms, and number  
of reported symptoms, respectively. The BSI is the short version of the SCL-R-90  
(Derogatis,1975, 1977). This study used only the Global Severity Index, which had a  
substantial internal consistency reliability (alpha) coefficient (α=.97). 
The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977). 
The CES-D is a 20-item screening test for depression and depressive disorders that 
asks participants to rate how often in the last week they have experienced symptoms 
related to depression, such as restless sleep and poor appetite. Participants rate their 
depressive symptoms on a scale from “Rarely or none of the time (less than 1 day), 
Some or a little of the time (1-2 days), Occasionally or a moderate amount of time (3-4 
days), and Most or all of the time (5-7 days).” Scores range from 0 to 60, with high 
scores indicating more depressive symptoms. The scale has high internal consistency 
with Cronbach’s alpha (coefficients of .85 with a normal population and .90 with a 
patient population) across studies, acceptable test-retest reliability, excellent 
concurrent validity by clinical and self-report criteria, and substantial evidence of 
construct validity (Radloff, 1977). In the current study, the internal consistency  
reliability (alpha) coefficient was significant (α=.83). 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983). The IRI is a well-validated 
empathy questionnaire that yields four subscales: empathic concern, perspective 
taking, fantasy and personal distress (Davis, 1983). Empathic concern and perspective 
taking are the subscales that are used to measure affective and cognitive empathy, 
respectively (Melchers et al., 2015). The fantasy and personal distress 
subscales have been criticized by Baron-Cohen and colleagues (Baron-Cohen & 
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Wheelright, 2004) for measuring indices correlated with empathy, as opposed to 
empathy per se; they argue that the fantasy subscale measures imagination, while the 
personal distress subscale measures emotional self-control. The IRI subscales were 
revealed to have good retest reliability, with values ranging from .61 to .81 
(Davis, 1983). Importantly, the IRI does not yield a total empathy subscale due to the 
orthogonality of the subscales (Davis, 1983). In the current study, the internal 
consistency reliability (alpha) coefficients for the two subscales confirmed the scale’s  
reliability: the alpha coefficient was .69 for perspective-taking and .75 for empathic 
concern. 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960).  
The MCSDS is a 33-item measure that yields a total social desirability score. The  
MCSDS was developed with a sample of college undergraduates in an American 
university and was found to have strong reliability (.88). Since its validation, the 
MCSDS has been used in samples across multiple countries and short forms have been 
validated as well (Reynolds, 1982; Lambert, Spencer, & Holden, 2016). In the  
current study, the internal consistency reliability (alpha) coefficient was significant 
(α=.80). 
Pathological Narcissism Inventory (PNI; Pincus et al., 2009). The PNI is a 52-item 
measure that yields 9 subscales: contingent self-esteem, exploitativeness, self- 
sacrificing self-enhancement, hiding the self, grandiose fantasy, devaluing, entitlement 
rage, grandiosity, vulnerability and pathological narcissism. The PNI was developed 
with a sample of 796 predominantly White college undergraduates and principal 
components analysis of the PNI items yielded a range of alphas from .49 to .81 (Pincus 
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et al., 2009). In the current study, the internal consistency reliability (alpha) coefficient 
was significant (α=.93). 
The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II screening questionnaire 
(SCID-II-SQ; First et al., 1997). The original SCID-II Questionnaire consists of 117 
yes-no questions, each corresponding to a criterion of one of the personality disorder 
diagnoses. For example, the questions include “Have you often become frantic when 
you thought that someone you really cared about was going to leave you?” to diagnose 
Borderline Personality Disorder and “Do most people fail to appreciate your very 
special talents or accomplishments?” to diagnose Narcissistic Personality Disorder. 
This study will use a 4-point dimensional scoring of the SCID (0 = never or not at all, 
1 = sometimes or a little, 2 = often or moderately, 3 = very often or extreme); this 4- 
point format has been used in a previous study (Meyer, Pilkonis, & Beevers, 2004). 
Higher scores indicate higher levels of personality pathology. Ouimette and Klein  
(1995) reported reasonable stability of the SCID-II-SQ scales over 10 weeks with a 
nonclinical sample. Meyer and colleagues (2004) reported internal consistency: the 
Cronbach’s α for the 7-point item avoidant scale was .79, the 15-item borderline 
scale was .86, and the 6-item schizoid scale was .55. In the present study, the internal  
consistency reliability (alpha) coefficient for the 15-item borderline scale was not  
significant (α=.54). However, as Meyer et al. (2004) argue, an alpha coefficient that is  
above .50 is considered to be at the minimally acceptable threshold for internal  
consistency. This study will make use only of the BPD symptom score. 
3.4.2 Performance-based measures  
Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET; Foell et. al, 2018). The MET is a behavioral task 
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that requires participants to look at 40 photographic images of emotional scenes, each 
of which is accompanied by one target word and three distractor words. Participants’ 
accuracy in choosing the target word constitutes the cognitive empathy score, and 
there are two additional cognitive empathy scores yielded: one for only the 
participants’ accuracy in identifying the emotions in negatively-valenced pictures, and 
another for positively-valenced pictures. Participants are also asked to rate how much 
they empathize with the person in the photograph from a scale of 1 (not at all) to 9 
(very much); these responses constitute three affective empathy scores: one in 
response to all the photographs, one in response to the negatively-valenced 
photographs, and one in response to the positively-valenced photographs. The MET 
was first developed in German (Dziobek et al., 2008), and then translated into English 
by Foell et al. (2018) using multiple translators. Cronbach’s alpha for the cognitive 
empathy scale was low (α=.51); after performing greatest lower bound (glb) analysis 
that controlled for variations in accuracy of responding to items within a test, the 
reality estimate of glb was .75. For the emotional empathy scales, reliability was high: 
Cronbach’s alpha was .93 for affective empathy for positive pictures, and .94 for 
affective empathy for negative pictures. Similarly, in the current study, Cronbach’s  
alpha was low for the total cognitive empathy scale (α=.48), as well as for the  
cognitive empathy for negative pictures only (α=.20) and positive pictures only  
(α=.32). Also similar to Foell et al.’s (2018) study, Cronbach’s alpha for the current  
study’s emotional empathy scores were high: 91 for the total emotional empathy score,  
.92 for the positive pictures only score, and .94 for the negative pictures only score. 
Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006). The 
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MASC is a test of cognitive empathy that requires participants to watch a 15-minute 
movie that involves characters in various social situations, and asks participants to answer 
questions about the intentions and reactions of the characters. There are four subscales in 
the MASC: cognitive empathy (total score), recognize emotions, recognize thoughts, and 
recognize intentions. The MASC was found to have good internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha was 0.84 for the total empathy score) and test-retest reliability 
comparing two administrations 12 months apart; the intraclass correlation coefficients 
(ICCs) equaled .97 for the whole sample. 
3.5 Hypotheses 
Aim 1: To identify if there are distinct associations between narcissism (including its two 
expressions, vulnerability and grandiosity) and two subtypes of empathy (cognitive 
versus affective) on two performance-based tasks and one self-report of empathy.  
H1a: Better cognitive empathy and poorer affective empathy on the Multifaceted 
Empathy Test (MET) and Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC) will be 
associated with greater pathological narcissism on the Pathological Narcissism Inventory 
(PNI). We will also investigate the association between these empathy measures and the 
two manifestations of pathological narcissism: vulnerability and grandiosity. 
H1b: Better cognitive empathy (perspective-taking) and poorer affective empathy 
(empathic concern) on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) will be associated with 
greater pathological narcissism on the PNI. We will also investigate the association 
between this self-report and the two manifestations of pathological narcissism: 
vulnerability and grandiosity. 
Aim 2: To identify if empathic abilities in narcissism and its two expressions, 
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vulnerability and grandiosity, are better characterized by performance-based measures of 
empathy than by self-report when controlling for social desirability.  
H2: Pathological narcissistic traits will be uniquely related to performance-based 
measures of empathy (i.e., MET and MASC) rather than to self-report (i.e., IRI) when 
controlling for social desirability. We will also examine this hypothesis focusing on the 
two major expressions of pathological narcissism: vulnerability and grandiosity.  
 
 
Figure 1. Hypotheses 1a and 1b 
 
 
3.6. Data Analysis 
The mean and standard deviations for the following measures were computed: 
pathological narcissism, vulnerability and grandiosity on the PNI; cognitive empathy on 
















empathy for all pictures, only positive pictures, and only negative pictures on the MET, 
the other performance-based task of empathy; perspective-taking (cognitive empathy) and 
empathic concern (affective empathy) on the IRI, a self-report measure of empathy; BPD 
symptoms on the SCID-II questionnaire; CES-D; BSI; MCSDS. Correlations among all 
the empathy scales were also conducted: cognitive empathy on the MASC, cognitive and 
affective empathy for all pictures, only positive pictures, and only negative pictures on the 
MET, and perspective-taking (cognitive empathy) and empathic concern (affective 
empathy) on the IRI. Lastly, correlations among the PNI (pathological narcissism total 
score, narcissistic vulnerability, and narcissistic grandiosity) and all of the aforementioned 
empathy scales were calculated. Partial correlations between PNI grandiosity and the 
empathy scales controlling for PNI vulnerability were conducted, as suggested by Crowe, 
Lynam, Campbell & Miller, 2019.  
Based on correlation results, we performed a hierarchical regression analysis to 
test which empathy measures were uniquely associated with PNI scales, when controlling 
for social desirability. 
Secondly, we performed hierarchical regression analyses to test if empathy 
measures uniquely linked to pathological narcissism (Model 1) maintain their effect when 
controlling for demographic (i.e., gender) and psychopathological variables (i.e., 









4.1 Correlations among the empathy measures 
Prior to testing the study’s hypotheses, the relationship between the primary 
variables of the current investigation were examined. Cognitive empathy on the MASC 
was significantly positively correlated with cognitive empathy on the MET; MASC 
cognitive empathy was positively correlated with affective empathy on the MET, but not 
significantly. Additionally, cognitive empathy on the MASC was significantly positively 
correlated with both perspective-taking (cognitive empathy) and empathic concern 
(affective empathy) on the IRI. The MET cognitive empathy subscale significantly 
positively correlated only with perspective-taking (cognitive empathy), but not 
significantly with empathic concern (affective empathy) on the IRI. These correlations are 
summarized in Table 3. 
4.2 Testing the hypotheses 
4.2.1 Identifying associations between all measures of empathy and PNI grandiosity, 
vulnerability, and pathological narcissism 
Hypothesis 1a predicted that better cognitive empathy and poorer affective 
empathy on the Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET) and Movie for the Assessment of 
Social Cognition (MASC), two performance-based tasks of empathy, would be associated 
with greater pathological narcissism on the Pathological Narcissism Inventory (PNI); 
pathological narcissism’s two manifestations, vulnerability and grandiosity, would also be 
explored. Relatedly, hypothesis 1b predicted that better cognitive empathy (perspective-
taking) and poorer affective empathy (empathic concern) on the Interpersonal Reactivity 
 
35 
Index (IRI), a self-report measure of empathy, would be associated with greater 
pathological narcissism on the Pathological Narcissism Inventory (PNI); pathological 
narcissism’s two manifestations, vulnerability and grandiosity, would also be explored. 
This hypothesis was partially supported. 
In order to test hypotheses 1a and 1b, correlations between the PNI and all 
empathy measures were examined (Table 4). Contrary to hypothesis 1a, it was found that 
there was no significant correlation between cognitive empathy on the MASC and the 
three narcissism scores on the PNI: vulnerability, grandiosity, and pathological narcissism 
total score. Also contrary to expectations, there was no significant correlation between the 
global cognitive empathy and global affective empathy scores on the MET and the three 
narcissism scores on the PNI. However, there was a significant positive correlation 
between cognitive empathy on the MET for negative pictures only and both pathological 
narcissism and vulnerability on the PNI. Regarding hypothesis 1b, it was found that while 
IRI empathic concern (affective empathy) had no significant relationship with any PNI 
subscale, there was a significant negative correlation between IRI perspective-taking 
(cognitive empathy) and vulnerability on the PNI (see Table 4). Regarding hypotheses 1a 
and 1b, no empathy measures were found to be associated with PNI grandiosity. 
4.2.2 Unique associations between narcissism and measures of empathy 
Hypothesis 2 stated that empathic abilities and deficits associated with 
pathological narcissism and its two manifestations, vulnerability and grandiosity, would 
be uniquely related to performance-based measures of empathy (i.e., MET and MASC) 
and not to self-report (i.e., IRI) when controlling for social desirability. After testing 
hypothesis 1a, we found that no empathy measures were associated with PNI grandiosity, 
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only one empathy measure (MET cognitive empathy for negative pictures only) was 
associated with PNI pathological narcissism, and two empathy measures (better MET 
cognitive empathy for negative pictures and poorer IRI perspective-taking) were 
associated with PNI vulnerability. Thus, we conducted a multiple regression analysis 
predicting PNI vulnerability in order to test hypothesis 2. We did not conduct a regression 
analysis of pathological narcissism because only one empathy measure was associated 
with it, and we did not conduct a regression analysis of PNI grandiosity because no 
empathy measures were associated with it. 
In the hierarchical regression analysis of PNI vulnerability, we used as predictors 
the two empathy scores that significantly correlated with PNI vulnerability: MET 
cognitive empathy for negative pictures and IRI perspective-taking (cognitive empathy) in 
Model 1, and the self-report measure of social desirability (MCSDS) in Model 2. We were 
interested in whether the performance-based task of empathy was a better predictor of 
vulnerable narcissism than the self-report when controlling for social desirability, and thus 
compared the predictors by examining the standardized partial regression coefficients 
(“beta weights”) of each. We found that better MET cognitive empathy for negative 
pictures (β = .326, p = .001) and poorer IRI perspective-taking (β = -.389, p = .000) were 
equally significant predictors of PNI vulnerability in Model 1. However, in Model 2, when 
poorer social desirability (β = -.599, p = .000) was included, poorer IRI perspective-taking 
(β = -.118, p = .190) was no longer significantly associated with PNI vulnerability, while 
MET cognitive empathy for negative pictures (β = .194, p = .020) remained a significant 
predictor. The full regression analysis is presented in Table 5. 
Hypothesis 2 was thus partially supported. One performance-based task of 
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empathy, the MET, was uniquely associated with PNI vulnerability compared to self-
report (the IRI) when controlling for social desirability. However, it should be stated that 
the relationship between PNI vulnerability and the self-report measures of empathy and 
social desirability were in a different direction than expected: social desirability was 
negatively associated with PNI vulnerability, and this accounted for the relationship 
between negative self-reported cognitive empathy on the IRI and PNI vulnerability.   
4.3 Post hoc analyses 
4.3.1 Confounding variables 
 In order to identify potential confounding variables, the sample’s demographic 
characteristics, depression symptoms, general psychiatric symptoms, and Borderline 
Personality Disorder (BPD) features were examined. A one-way ANOVA revealed that 
there were no significant differences between racial categories on any of the study’s 
primary variables (the PNI, MASC, or MET). An independent-samples t-test was 
conducted on all of the primary variables in order to see if there were significant 
differences between male- and female-identified patients, and it was found that there 
were no significant differences between male- and female-identified participants on any 
of the study’s primary variables (the PNI, MASC, or MET). 
In order to control for gender, depression symptoms, general psychiatric 
symptoms, and (BPD) symptoms, we ran two hierarchical regression analyses for each of 
the two dependent variables: pathological narcissism and vulnerability. In the hierarchical 
regression of pathological narcissism, we ran in the first stage the one predictor of 
pathological narcissism, MET cognitive empathy for negative pictures only, and in the 
second stage we included all potential confounding predictors: gender, depression 
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symptoms, general psychiatric symptoms, and (BPD) symptoms. The findings of this 
hierarchical regression analysis are summarized in Table 6. 
In the hierarchical regression of vulnerability, we wanted to confirm whether the 
effect of MET cognitive empathy for negative pictures was confirmed when controlling 
for confounding variables related to demographics and psychopathology. Thus, we ran in 
the first stage MET cognitive empathy for negative pictures only, and in the second stage 
we included all potential confounding predictors: gender, depression symptoms, general 
psychiatric symptoms, and (BPD) symptoms. The findings of this hierarchical regression 
analysis are summarized in Table 7. 
 After controlling for gender, BPD symptoms, depression symptoms, and general 
psychiatric symptoms, MET cognitive empathy for negative pictures only was still 
significantly associated with pathological narcissism and vulnerability on the PNI. Thus, 
our hypotheses were strengthened by these post-hoc analyses because BPD symptoms, 
depression symptoms, and general psychiatric symptoms did not impact the association 













The present study examined the relationship between narcissism and its two 
expressions, vulnerability and grandiosity, and cognitive and affective empathy on two 
performance-based tasks (the MASC and the MET) and one self-report (the IRI) of 
empathy. There were two major aims of this study. The first aim was to identify if there 
are unique associations between narcissism (including its two expressions, vulnerability 
and grandiosity) and two subtypes of empathy (cognitive versus affective) on two 
performance-based tasks and one self-report of empathy. Secondly, this study sought to 
identify if empathic abilities in narcissism and its two expressions, vulnerability and 
grandiosity, are better characterized by performance-based measures of empathy than by 
self-report. 
This study has three important findings: 1.) Higher narcissistic vulnerability was 
associated with higher cognitive empathy for negative stimuli only on a performance-
based task 2.) Higher narcissistic vulnerability was associated with lower self-reported 
cognitive empathy 3.) Both lower self-reported cognitive empathy and higher 
performance-based cognitive empathy (for negative stimuli only) were associated with 
higher PNI vulnerability. However, social desirability accounted for the association 
between higher narcissistic vulnerability and lower self-reported cognitive empathy. 
These results will be discussed in detail below. 
5.1 PNI Vulnerability and Grandiosity subscales 
Prior to a more in-depth discussion of the study’s core hypotheses, it is necessary 
to review the primary narcissism measure, the PNI, so that its patterns of association 
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within the present study can be better understood. Specifically, this section will explore 
why no empathy measures were associated with the PNI grandiosity subscale, and why the 
vulnerability subscale and pathological narcissism total scores followed similar patterns of 
association with the study’s empathy measures. 
The PNI was first developed by Cain et al. (2008) because a widely-used self-
report, the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI: Raskin & Hall, 1979) was found to 
capture a limited range of narcissistic traits. Specifically, the NPI has been criticized for 
representing the more grandiose expressions of narcissism, while failing to capture criteria 
more associated with narcissistic vulnerability, such as grandiose fantasies, excessive need 
for admiration, envy, and lack of empathy. In recent years, the PNI has been evaluated for 
its ability to measure grandiosity, and questions have been raised about how well it 
differentiates vulnerability from grandiosity (Kaufman, Weiss, Miller, & Campbell, 2020). 
Miller et al. (2014) conducted an analysis comparing multiple measures of narcissism and 
found that while the NPI and the Five-Factor Narcissism Inventory (FFNI; Glover, Miller, 
Lynam, Crego, & Widiger, 2012) best predicted grandiose narcissism, the vulnerability 
subscales of the FFNI and the PNI were most associated with expert ratings of vulnerable 
narcissism. This study shed light on why the PNI might not capture grandiosity by 
demonstrating the ways in which PNI grandiosity overemphasizes negative 
emotionality/fragility and does not represent those traits related to antagonism, a trait that 
is central to grandiosity. Similarly, Miller, Lynam, and Campbell (2016) conducted a 
study using the NPI, PNI, and Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire (PDQ-4; Hyler, 1994) 
to assess how strong were the associations each self-report had with the traits of NPD in 
Section III of the DSM-5 (DSM-5; APA, 2013). The authors found that only the subscale 
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of exploitativeness on the PNI (a subscale within the grandiosity subscale) was associated 
with the DSM-5 ratings of NPD, while the grandiosity, vulnerability and pathological 
narcissism scales did not have a relationship with NPD expert clinician ratings at all. 
 While some posit that the PNI is a better measure of vulnerability because the 
grandiosity subscale does not adequately capture grandiose narcissism, others have 
argued that the PNI does, in fact, adequately differentiate between the two expressions. In 
a recent study by Edershile, Simms, & Wright (2019) examining the nomological 
networks of PNI grandiosity and vulnerability using hierarchical regression, the authors 
argue that when accounting for the shared variance between PNI grandiosity and 
vulnerability, the positive associations between grandiosity and negative 
emotionality/fragility become non-significant. They further argue that the PNI taps into 
more pathological manifestations of narcissism, and it misses the aspects of grandiosity 
not associated with maladaptivity or clinical distress. Regardless of whether the PNI 
adequately distinguishes grandiosity from vulnerability, Edershile et al.’s (2019) results 
confirm similar analyses positing that PNI vulnerability must be partialed out of the 
grandiosity subscale if the latter is used to measure grandiosity, as was done in the 
present study. 
For the purposes of this study, it suffices to say that because both PNI 
vulnerability and the PNI pathological narcissism total score have consistently shown to 
be strong indicators of narcissistic vulnerability (Crowe et al., 2019), it is unsurprising 
that PNI pathological narcissism and vulnerability shared similar patterns of associations 
in the current study. While greater PNI pathological narcissism was associated with 
higher cognitive empathy for negative stimuli only on the MET, PNI vulnerable 
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narcissism was associated with MET for negative stimuli only as well as lower self-
reported cognitive empathy. Thus, the pathological narcissism score’s association with 
the performance-based task may have been driven by its vulnerability components. 
Additionally, it is possible that because this study used a non-clinical sample, the more 
adaptive aspects of grandiosity that Edershile et al. (2019) argue are missing from the 
PNI did not emerge. For these reasons, the conceptualization of the present study’s 
results will be grounded in what they reveal about narcissistic vulnerability, and 
narcissism as a disorder that is constituted by fluctuations between the two (Gore & 
Widiger, 2016; Roche, Pincus, Conroy, Hyde, & Ram, 2013; Ronningstam, 2009; Pincus, 
Cain & Wright, 2014), while keeping in mind that grandiose features within the present 
study’s sample may not have been fully represented. 
5.2 Main Finding: Higher PNI Vulnerability and Enhanced Cognitive Empathy on the 
Multifaceted Empathy Test for negative pictures only 
Our first hypothesis predicted that better cognitive and poorer affective empathy 
on the Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET) and Movie for the Assessment of Social 
Cognition (MASC) would be associated with greater pathological narcissism on the 
Pathological Narcissism Inventory (PNI). We found that better cognitive empathy on the 
MET was associated with PNI vulnerability, but for negative emotional expressions of 
others only. 
As a review, the MET asks participants to view a picture of a person and select 
from a list of four which emotions the person is feeling: the greater the accuracy with 
which a participant identifies the pictured person's emotion, the higher the cognitive 
empathy score. Half of the pictures in the MET depict negative emotions, while the other 
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half are positively-valenced. Thus, the task yields distinct cognitive empathy scores for 
negative and positive emotions. 
To the best of the authors knowledge, no study to date that employs the MET 
specifically to examine empathic abilities in psychopathology has found that enhanced 
cognitive empathy is associated with narcissism or psychopathy. For example, the only 
other study besides the present one to use the MET and the MASC to explore the 
relationship between empathy and narcissism, Ritter et al. (2011), found no difference on 
either MET or MASC cognitive empathy between healthy controls and NPD patients. In 
studies of psychopathy, similar cognitive and reduced affective empathy scores on the 
MET have been found in psychopathy patients compared to healthy controls (Foell et al., 
2018; Oliver, Neufeld, Dziobek, & Mitchell, 2016; Domes, Hollerbach, Vohs, Mokros, & 
Habermeyer, 2013). 
In this study, participants who were better able to identify negative emotions on 
the MET (e.g., “distraught” or “frustrated”) had higher PNI vulnerability scores. This 
suggests that there is a relationship between narcissistic vulnerability and enhanced 
ability to accurately detect negative emotions, which is consistent with prior literature on 
the topic. Wai & Tiliopoulos, (2012) employed a facial identification task very similar to 
the MET (one that asks participants to identify the emotions of pictured subjects) and 
found that narcissism was associated with an increased ability to identify angry faces, but 
not associated with an increased ability to identify happy, sad, or fearful faces. Konrath, 
Corneille, Bushman, & Luminet (2014) found similar results in a study examining 
narcissism and performance on the “Reading the mind in the eyes” test (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001), which requires participants to identify the emotions of pictured individuals’ 
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eyes. They found that higher narcissistic exploitativeness was associated with increased 
accuracy in emotion recognition. Lastly, De Panfilis et al. (2019) sought to examine the 
threshold at which those with narcissistic traits recognize affect by employing a task that 
measures how well participants can identify emotions at varying intensities (25%, 50% or 
75%). The results showed that narcissistic individuals (as measured by the SCID-II 
Questionnaire; First et al., 1997) were the fastest at identifying negative emotions 
(sadness, fear, anger, or disgust) when they were shown at 25% intensity, the lowest 
threshold represented by the task. Importantly, narcissistic participants were able to 
correctly differentiate negative emotions from one another, and were adept at identifying 
neutral emotions at 100% intensity; thus, the accuracy with which participants high in 
narcissism identified subtle, negative facial expressions could not be explained by a bias 
towards seeing negative valence in photographs more generally, as has been shown in 
BPD patients (Herpertz & Bertsch, 2013).  
In Ronningstam’s (2011, p. 255) proposal for an alternate definition of NPD, she 
describes vulnerability in narcissism as, “evident by exaggerated reactivity. These 
individuals react strongly to perceived challenges or threats to self-esteem (i.e., 
humiliation, defeats, criticism and failure to measure up), with overt or covert intense 
feelings (anger, hostility, envy, rage, harsh self-criticism, shame).” This clinical picture 
posits the narcissistic individual as so bereft of a stable sense of self that his self-esteem 
and sense of agency is always in danger of being compromised by the negative behavior 
of another person. The findings of the present study provide empirical support for this 
theoretical formulation: in order to protect themselves from perennial threats to their self-
esteem, narcissistic individuals may be vigilant to negative affects expressed by others. By 
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becoming adept at recognizing negative emotions, the vulnerable narcissist can better 
protect himself from the shame and self-criticism he fears he will inevitably experience as 
a result of another person’s judgment and disapproval. Psychoanalytic perspectives that 
inform this theory will be discussed in a subsequent section (see below). 
5.3 Main Finding: Higher PNI Vulnerability and lower cognitive empathy (perspective-
taking) on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
  Hypothesis 1a in the current study predicted that better cognitive empathy 
(perspective-taking) and poorer affective empathy (empathic concern) on the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI) would be associated with greater pathological narcissism on the 
PNI. We found that poorer cognitive empathy on the IRI was associated with greater 
vulnerability on the PNI. 
The fact that poorer performance on this one subscale of the IRI was associated 
with vulnerable narcissism indicates that a compromised self-reported ability to imagine 
another person’s experience in the abstract (e.g., “I try to look at everybody's side of a 
disagreement before I make a decision”) was associated with higher narcissism. Studies on 
self-reported empathic capacity and narcissism have shown mixed results, but studies 
researching narcissism that employ the IRI have generally found an inverse relationship 
between its subscales and narcissism; specifically, lower perspective-taking has been 
associated with higher narcissism (Uzuegbu, Agbo, & Ebulum, 2018; Luchner & Tantleff-
Dunn, 2016; Marcoux et al., 2014; Vonk, Zeigler-Hill, Mayhew, & Mercer, 2013). The 
difficulty in making conclusions from these findings is that studies that employ the IRI 
have not been consistent in the narcissism measures they use, nor in the samples they 
recruit (clinical versus community or undergraduate). For example, Marissen, Deen, & 
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Franken (2012) found no difference in self-reported empathy on the IRI between healthy 
controls and patients with NPD, as measured by the Structured Clinical Interview for 
DSM-V (SCID), while Marcoux et al. (2014) found that NPD patients reported lower IRI 
perspective-taking; in the latter study, however, patients were diagnosed as NPD based on 
a clinical interview adapted from the Structural Interview for Personality Organization 
(Stern et al., 2010), the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised semi-structured interview (PCL-
R) (Hare, 2003), and medical and criminal records. It is therefore difficult to generalize 
the results of Marissen, Deen, & Franken (2012) and Marcoux et al. (2014), though both 
indicate that narcissism is generally not associated with better perspective-taking on the 
IRI. 
  Studies that explore the relationship between IRI perspective-taking and 
psychopathy have had more consistent results than those that examine narcissism, and 
they have generally found a relationship between higher psychopathy and lower levels of 
self-reported perspective-taking on the IRI (Robinson & Rogers, 2015; Pfabigan et al., 
2015; Brouns et al., 2013; Brook & Kosson, 2013). Exceptions to these studies’ findings 
have included results showing no difference in perspective-taking between psychopathic 
individuals and healthy controls (Domes, Hollerbach, Vohs, Mokros, & Habermeyer, 
2013). Additionally, poorer IRI perspective-taking has been found in adolescents with 
Autism spectrum conditions, such as Asperger Syndrome (AS) (Rueda, Fernández-
Berrocal, & Baron-Cohen, 2015) as well as in schizophrenia (Lee, Zaki, Harvey, Ochsner, 
& Green, 2011). 
On the IRI, the perspective-taking subscale measures how easily a participant 
adopts the views of another person, and most of the subscale’s questions reflect a desire to 
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adopt another’s view by consistently employing use of the phrase, “I try to…” For 
example, the subscale asks to rate how well the following questions describe the 
participant: “I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things 
look from their perspective” and “When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to ‘put myself 
in his shoes’ for a while.”  Ritter et al. (2011) found that patients with NPD reported 
significantly lower scores on IRI perspective-taking compared to healthy controls, and 
concluded that perspective-taking may measure not cognitive empathy per se (or the 
ability to correctly identify the emotions of others), but rather a motivation to do so. Ritter 
et al. (2011) made this conclusion in part by contrasting their participants’ lower IRI 
perspective-taking scores with the fact that MET cognitive empathy scores for NPD 
patients were no different from healthy controls. 
The consistency between the current study’s findings on IRI perspective-taking 
and those in the study conducted by Ritter at al. (2011) suggests that higher narcissism in 
both clinical and undergraduate student samples may be related to lower IRI perspective-
taking because perspective-taking on the IRI measures neither a participant’s true 
cognitive empathy ability nor their own assessment of cognitive empathy, but rather how 
much they desire to be cognitively empathic. Thus, despite the fact that the IRI is 
hampered by reporting biases like most self-report measures (Bringle, Phillips, & 
Hudson, 2004), it may accurately assess the motivation to be empathic, as opposed to 
empathic ability. This conclusion has been made by multiple studies employing the IRI: 
in a recent meta-analytic review examining studies of affective versus cognitive empathy 
deficits in narcissism, studies that employ the IRI specifically were found to show a 
negative relationship between self-reported empathy and narcissism (Urbonaviciute & 
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Hepper, 2020). This finding is so prevalent, in fact, that it has been argued that cognitive 
empathy scores yielded by self-report measures such as the IRI currently lack adequate 
validity evidence to represent the construct of cognitive empathy ability (Murphy & 
Lilienfeld, 2019).  
Regarding the common finding that narcissism is associated with lower 
motivation to consider another’s perspective (as opposed to a compromised ability to do 
so), some have argued that it is the result of self-protection (De Panfilis et al., 2019); in 
other words, those with narcissistic traits may decline to engage in empathic processes for 
fear of experiencing or showing vulnerability. It is important to remember that the IRI 
(Davis, 1983) contains four subscales: perspective-taking, empathic concern, personal 
distress, and fantasy. While perspective-taking and empathic concern roughly map onto 
the constructs of cognitive and affective empathy, respectively, (i.e., perspective-taking 
assesses the extent to which individuals spontaneously adopt others' points of view and 
empathic concern assesses the extent of individuals' feelings of compassion and concern 
for others), personal distress measures the "feelings of anxiety and discomfort" that a 
person may experience as a result of "another's negative experience" (Davis, 1983, p. 
116). This multidimensional view of empathy is supported by current theories in social 
neuroscience and psychology that draw a distinction between self- and other-oriented 
empathic responses. An other-oriented empathic response takes the form of feeling for 
another person with limited to no distress on the part of the empathizer, whereas a self-
oriented response is marked by feeling overwhelming empathic or personal distress that 
may impede the ability to share another person’s perspective (O’Connor, Berry, Lewis, & 
Stiver, 2011). A lower score on perspective-taking on the IRI, therefore, may represent a 
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lack of motivation to empathize given a fear of experiencing vicariously induced negative 
emotions that threaten the self.  
5.4 Summary of MET and IRI findings: Psychoanalytic perspectives 
In summary, two of the present study’s three main findings suggest that 
narcissism is characterized by an enhanced ability to recognize negative affect and by a 
lack of motivation to cognitively empathize with others. There is what appears to be a 
contradiction within these findings: on the one hand, the narcissistic individual lacks a 
desire to take the perspective of another, generally answering “no” to questions such as, “I 
sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
perspective.” On the other hand, the narcissistic individual seeks the identification of 
negative affect in the other, possibly in order to disconfirm their fear that the other thinks 
poorly of them, and thus may pose a threat to his contingent and precarious self-esteem. 
However, when viewed through the lens of psychoanalytic theory, particularly that of 
object relations and attachment theory, these two proclivities (to disavow perspective-
taking and actively engage in negative affect recognition) both represent behaviors driven 
by internalized representations of self and other that are theorized to be characteristic of 
narcissism. 
Both Kernberg (1985) and Kohut (1977) theorize that misattuned parenting lays 
the groundwork for narcissistic pathology: either overly rejecting or overinvolved parents 
fail to adequately mirror their child’s burgeoning sense of self, which results in a fusion of 
the mature ego with the grandiose self, a proto-self born of exhibitionism and demands for 
attention. Kohut (1971) asserts that in the narcissistic individual, the grandiose self battles 
with the mature ego, which it contaminates with archaic, grandiose strivings that the 
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mature ego cannot reasonably harness. Similarly, in Kernberg’s conceptualization, the 
actual self (mature ego) and the grandiose self are fused, resulting in an individual’s 
unrealistic expectations of the self that can be maintained without the perceived need for 
anyone else’s input. Kernberg (1985, p. 231) also theorizes that “unacceptable self 
images” are projected onto objects that the narcissistic individual can devalue. Thus, the 
narcissistic self concept is a self-contained system in which no other person is considered 
or required except as the screen on which to project negative aspects of the self, and thus 
the potential for either approval or rejection is obviated on the conscious level. On the 
unconscious level, however, there is a persistent desire for approval that seeks to 
compensate for the self-esteem deficits of early childhood. We argue that it is the 
conscious disavowal of approval that may account for our finding that narcissism is 
associated with a lack of motivation to take another person’s perspective, while the 
unconscious desire for approval explains our finding on enhanced negative affect 
recognition in narcissism. 
Regarding the connection between unconscious desire for approval and enhanced 
affect recognition in narcissism, individuals with narcissism may become adept at seeking 
out and identifying negative affect in others because they rely excessively on external 
positive feedback to support their precarious self-esteem (De Panfilis et al., 2019). 
Importantly, recent research in the areas of object relations and mentalization theory have 
also suggested that a hyperattunement to the affect of others is related to epistemic 
mistrust. Epistemic trust is defined as an individual's willingness to consider new social 
communication as trustworthy and relevant, both on a personal and more generalizable 
level. As Diamond, Yeomans, Stern, and Kernberg (in press) highlight, Peter Fonagy and 
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his colleagues have argued that those with narcissistic disorders may lack the ability to 
mentalize, or the ability to understand the mental state of one’s self and others, because 
misattuned parenting has led them to develop epistemic mistrust. As a consequence, these 
narcissistic individuals become both generally mistrustful of social communication and 
hyperattuned to the needs of others “in order to insure psychic survival” (Diamond et al., 
in press, p. 29). In other words, the unstable parental environment, contrasted with the 
maternal holding environment that Winnicott (1960) argues is necessary to ensure a 
proper transition to autonomy, induces a (mal)adaptive response in the narcissistic 
individual, one that requires him to become exceedingly adept at anticipating the needs of 
others so that he may know whether another person represents a threat to him. It is not 
difficult to imagine that by contrast, one who received more even parenting may become 
equally attuned to both positively- and negatively-valenced environmental cues. 
Lastly, the aforementioned theory that the narcissistic individual projects negative 
aspects of the self onto the other (Kernberg, 1985) provides a meaningful theoretical 
explanation for the two findings of compromised self-reported perspective-taking and 
enhanced negative affect recognition, one that has also found empirical support in recent 
research. If narcissism is associated with a relentless projection of negative aspects onto 
the other due to a fusing of the grandiose self with the actual self (i.e., confusing the idea 
of who one is with who one wants to be) (Kernberg, 1985), an enhanced ability to identify 
negative affect may represent the narcissistic individual’s attempt to maintain the 
separation between idealized images of the self and split off, devalued aspects of the self 
that are projected onto the other. The phenomenon of narcissistic projection was given 
empirical validation in a recent study examining self-other differentiation in an 
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undergraduate sample (Karan, Diamond, Grinband, & Fertuck, 2019). The authors 
measured the accuracy of differentiating one’s own image relative to that of another 
person by using a task that asked participants to detect an image of themselves morphed at 
varying degrees with faces of other people. It was found that vulnerable narcissism in 
particular was associated with a tendency to see one’s self in an image, though not with a 
compromised ability to differentiate one’s self from another person. Taken together with 
this study’s findings, there is a consistent picture of what characterizes the narcissistic 
intrapsychic landscape: while narcissism is associated with relatively intact reality testing, 
it is also marked by porous boundaries between self and other, and a concomitant ability 
to see the projected, negative aspect of the self in another person. This accounts for the 
frequent observations in clinical contexts of narcissistic patients as both self-involved or 
apathetic about the opinions of others, and as hyperattuned to the possibility of being 
excluded by others from whom they are not well differentiated (Diamond et al., in press). 
5.5 Main Finding: Social Desirability on the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
Our second hypothesis predicted that pathological narcissistic traits would be 
uniquely related to performance-based measures of empathy (i.e., MET and MASC) rather 
than to self-report (i.e., IRI) when controlling for social desirability. We found that PNI 
vulnerability was uniquely related to better cognitive empathy on the MET for negative 
pictures only rather than to lower IRI perspective-taking when controlling for MCSDS 
social desirability. Thus, the hypothesis was supported, but in a different direction than 
expected: we expected that higher self-reported empathy would be associated with 
narcissism, and that higher social desirability would account for higher self-reported 
empathy. Instead, lower self-reported empathy was associated with narcissism, and this 
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was accounted for by lower social desirability. 
We hypothesized that pathological narcissistic traits would be uniquely related to 
performance-based measures of empathy rather than to self-report because of extant 
research that show clear discrepancies between self-reported empathy and empathy as 
measured by more ecologically-valid tasks within narcissism: specifically, narcissistic 
individuals have been found to over-report empathic abilities but display compromised 
empathy on tasks within the same study (Marissen, Deen, & Franken, 2012; Czarna, 
Wróbel, Dufner, and Zeigler-Hill, 2015). These findings, when examined alongside 
research that shows how individuals in general over-report their empathic abilities for 
reasons related to social desirability (Vachon & Lynam, 2016; Melchers et al, 2015; 
Reniers et al., 2011; Spreng et al., 2009; Dziobek et al, 2008; Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004; Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991), led us to hypothesize in the 
current study that performance-based tasks of empathy would more accurately capture 
empathic ability in narcissism than self-report. Furthermore, social desirability is theorized 
to help regulate self-esteem in individuals who desire the acceptance, recognition, and 
approval of others (Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991), and has been conceptualized as a 
two-factor construct consisting both of self-deception (i.e., exaggerating one’s own 
positive traits to fit one’s own ideals) and other-deception (i.e., impression management 
wherein one presents oneself positively in order to impress others) (Paulhus, 2002). If we 
conceptualize narcissism as in part defined by such a desire for approval, we reasoned that 
those high in narcissism may wish to inhibit responding in a way that could lead to social 
rejection. 
The finding that, contrary to expectations, vulnerable narcissism was associated 
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with lower social desirability requires an analysis of what relationship social desirability 
has to narcissism in current research on the topic. In studies that directly examine 
narcissism and social desirability, it has generally been found that, consistent with the 
present study’s results, the two are inversely related. Raskin et al. (1991) found that 
narcissism and component social desirability were negatively related, while Barry, Lui, & 
Anderson (2017) found a negative relationship between vulnerable narcissism on the PNI 
and social desirability amongst adolescents. The authors argue that the tendency in 
vulnerable narcissism to devalue others and internalize symptoms may account for a 
limited interest in impression management. This is consistent with theories on the 
narcissistic tendency to denigrate others for not meeting unrealistic expectations 
(Diamond et al., in press), which explains a lack of interest in impression management. In 
other words, if the other is often denigrated because they contain split-off, projected 
negative aspects of the narcissist’s self-conception, it follows that this other person’s 
opinion would not be valued. 
On the other hand, one could also posit that it is specifically low self-esteem in 
vulnerable narcissism that leads to an attenuated desire for other’s approval: the 
vulnerable narcissist sees himself as inferior, and thus may defensively lack a conscious 
interest in convincing someone else of his worth. The impulse to care less (or not at all) 
about the approval of others is thus akin to the social avoidance characteristic of 
vulnerable narcissism, which has been described as an attempt to protect the ego, and can 
take the form of avoiding interpersonal relationships in order to reduce the risk of social 
rejection (Ronningstam, 2011). This is aligned with yet another study delineating 
grandiose and vulnerable narcissism on the PNI, which found a relationship between 
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vulnerable narcissism and the coping strategies of denial and behavioral (but not mental) 
disengagement in response to stress (Fernie, Fung & Nikčević, 2016). Thus, when 
avoidance has not worked initially and the vulnerable narcissist is faced with a stressful 
situation, they may deny and attempt to disengage so as to further protect a self that is 
perennially threatened by the actions of others.   
5.6.1 Narcissism and Psychopathology  
  Though not included in the current study’s primary aims, we were interested in 
examining whether our empathy measures were significantly associated with narcissism 
when controlling for psychopathological (i.e., BPD symptoms and depression and general 
psychiatric symptoms) and demographic (i.e., gender) variables. We found that after 
controlling for these variables, higher cognitive empathy for negative pictures only on the 
MET was still significantly associated with vulnerable and pathological narcissism on the 
PNI. 
  Regarding psychopathological variables, we first examined whether the sample’s 
BPD symptoms accounted for the variance in vulnerable narcissism explained by higher 
MET cognitive empathy for negative pictures. We were interested in this because 
vulnerable narcissistic and BPD traits are positively associated (Euler et al., 2018). 
Specifically, in an undergraduate sample, anxiety, depression, self-consciousness, and 
vulnerability to stress were positively correlated with vulnerable narcissism and BPD 
(Miller et al., 2017). Further, in the Emerging Models and Measures (Section III) in the 
Alternative Model for Personality Disorders (AMPD) of the DSM-5, negative affect traits 
such as depressivity and anxiousness are suggested to help determine presentations of 
vulnerable narcissism, which is consistent with prior research on the topic showing that 
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vulnerable narcissism is associated with traits of neuroticism (Miller et al., 2017). Current 
research has consequently examined how inclusion of vulnerable narcissistic traits affects 
differential diagnosis, i.e., does including affective lability in the assessment of narcissism 
help differentiate NPD from antisocial PD, or does it run the risk of creating overlap with 
BPD. Using clinician ratings from the Structured Interview for DSM-IV Personality 
(SIDP-IV), Stanton & Zimmerman (2018) found that expanding the criteria for NPD by 
including affective lability increased how much BPD and NPD diagnoses co-occurred. 
However, the authors emphasize that SIDP-IV items typically used to assess BPD were 
included in the expanded configurations of NPD in the study, so the finding may be 
particular to the methodology used. 
In a study using the PNI that similarly investigated the relationship between 
narcissistic traits and emotion regulation, Di Pierro, Di Sarno & Madeddu (2017) found 
that distinct subscales on the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & 
Roemer, 2004) were uniquely related to both PNI vulnerable narcissism and self-reported 
BPD symptoms. Specifically, vulnerable narcissism was associated with a lack of interest 
in or awareness of emotions, while BPD symptoms were associated with impulsivity and 
difficulty accomplishing goals while in a negative emotional state. The authors posit that 
their findings indicate that vulnerable narcissism is characterized by a unique clinical 
picture separate from that of BPD: on the one hand, those who have BPD are more 
susceptible to the immediate experience of a negative affective state, whereas vulnerable 
narcissists are adept at defensively becoming detached from emotional experiences in 
order to preserve their self-image. Taken together with the current study’s findings that 
BPD symptoms do not account for the relationship between enhanced cognitive empathy 
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on the MET and vulnerable narcissism, and that vulnerable narcissism is associated with 
lower social desirability, a clinical picture of the vulnerable narcissist emerges. This 
clinical picture reveals the vulnerable narcissist as outwardly uninterested in the emotions 
of one’s self and others, but covertly very adept in empathizing with the negative affect 
that another person is expressing in order to resist threats to their contingent and 
precarious self-esteem.  
  We were interested also in whether MET cognitive empathy for negative 
emotional expressions of others was uniquely associated with pathological and vulnerable 
narcissism after controlling for depression and general psychiatric symptoms. We were 
especially interested in psychiatric symptoms and their relationship to vulnerable 
narcissism because of the extant research on vulnerable narcissism and depressive or 
anxious temperament. In a study examining PNI scores in a college sample, Tritt, Ryder, 
Ring, and Pincus (2009) found that vulnerability, but not grandiosity, is related to 
depressive, anxious, cyclothymic, and asthenic temperament in a college sample, and that 
vulnerability’s relationship to these constructs cannot be explained by vulnerability’s 
shared variance with neuroticism, for example. Importantly, depressive personality also 
may be positively correlated with vulnerable narcissism in both clinical and non-clinical 
samples (Huprich, Luchner, Roberts, & Pouliot, 2012).  
  If in the present study, depression and general psychiatric symptoms did not 
account for the relationship between vulnerable narcissism and MET cognitive empathy 
for negative pictures only, what does this mean about how depression and vulnerable 
narcissism interrelate? Depressive symptoms often co-occur with narcissistic pathology 
because depression is a reaction to faltering narcissistic defenses (Fjermestad-Noll et al., 
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2020). This theory is supported by empirical evidence that shows how depressive 
tendencies related to self-definition and self-criticism are associated with narcissistic 
vulnerability in a psychiatric outpatient sample (Kealy, Tsai, & Ogrodniczuk, 2012), and 
that perfectionism mediates the positive relationship between depressive symptoms and 
increased vulnerability on the PNI (Marčinko et al., 2014). Thus, depression appears to 
emerge in vulnerable narcissism specifically when threats to self-esteem confirm a 
negative self-view. Depression and general psychiatric symptom scores may not have 
affected the relationship between MET cognitive empathy for negative pictures only and 
vulnerable narcissism in the present study because the ability to identify negative affect in 
the other may be a core feature of vulnerable narcissism regardless of whether there is a 
co-occurrence of psychiatric symptoms. If the identification of negative affect in the other 
is an attempt to protect against perennial threats to self-esteem, then it follows that this 
ability would hold constant whether the vulnerable narcissistic individual is experiencing 
significant distress or not. 
5.6.2 Narcissism and Gender Differences 
  This study found no statistically significant difference between female- and male-
identified participants across the PNI’s three main subscales: vulnerability, grandiosity, 
and pathological narcissism. Similarly, there was no significant difference across gender 
in the empathy subscales that had a significant association with the PNI: MET cognitive 
empathy for negative pictures only and IRI perspective-taking. Only the empathic concern 
subscale on the IRI and cognitive empathy on the MASC showed a significant gender 
difference, and in both of these subscales, female-identified participants scored higher. 
  To our knowledge, there are no extant studies on the topic of empathy deficit 
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differences across genders in narcissism in either a clinical or non-clinical population. 
Research on gender differences in narcissism are somewhat more prevalent, though it 
remains an under-researched area. Studies examining data from the Wave 2 National 
Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions (NESARC) found that rates of 
NPD were higher for men (7.7%) than women (4.8%) (Stinson et al., 2008) and that NPD 
was more prevalent in those who identify their race as Black than those who identify as 
White or Hispanic (Pulay & Grant, 2013). In a study specifically examining gender 
invariance on the PNI in undergraduates, the authors found that the PNI was invariant 
across gender (Wright, Lukowitsky, Pincus, & Conroy, 2010); this finding is consistent 
with that of the current undergraduate study, though more research is needed to confirm 
whether the gender invariance holds in clinical rather than college samples. Additionally, 
future research should examine gender differences across the vulnerability and grandiosity 
subscales of the PNI in order to determine whether there is no difference between them 
across gender lines, as was found both in the current study and in a meta-analytic review 
employing the PNI and other measures (Grijalva et al., 2015). It is important to clarify 
gender differences in narcissism because lay assumptions posit that narcissism is higher in 
male- rather than female-identified individuals. Understanding what gender differences 
truly exist can aid in improving treatment of narcissistic patients, as the perpetuation of lay 
assumptions contributes to unconscious cultural stereotypes that can negatively impact 
patient care (McDowell, Goldhammer, Potter, & Keuroghlian, 2020). 
5.7 Clinical Implications 
Findings from the current study have key clinical implications for the treatment of 
narcissism because they offer a more nuanced picture of the disorder, including what 
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differentiates the vulnerable from the grandiose presentation. The differences between 
vulnerable and grandiose presentations may affect the treatment of narcissism: when 
patients experience a state characterized more by vulnerability, they miss therapy 
appointments less frequently and make more regular use of crisis and partial 
hospitalization services (Pincus et al., 2009). In a follow-up study examining PNI scores 
and treatment outcome variables in a community mental health center, Ellison, Levy, 
Cain, Ansell, & Pincus, (2013) found that grandiosity was associated with decreased 
utilization of clinical services as well as increased client-initiated drop out rates, relative 
to narcissistically vulnerable clients. Given that a narcissistic individual may fluctuate 
between grandiose and vulnerable self-states (Gore & Widiger, 2016; Roche, Pincus, 
Conroy, Hyde, & Ram, 2013; Ronningstam, 2009), attending to which self-state a 
narcissistic patient is experiencing may facilitate the therapist’s ability to adjust her 
technique accordingly. For example, a narcissistic patient with a more grandiose 
presentation may balk at the interpretation of an instance of projection, one that attempts 
to elucidate how the patient views his spouse as unempathic in ways he cannot recognize 
in himself. That same patient may eventually attend therapy in a more vulnerable state, 
one in which his self-esteem has been diminished by this spouse’s suggestion that they 
divorce. In this vulnerable state where the patient is feeling unsure of himself, the 
therapist may better navigate the process of working through what role the patient plays 
in his rocky relationships because he is in a state in which he is more desirous of 
acceptance from the therapist. If the therapist can attend to the narcissistic patient’s self-
state, it may prevent premature drop out from treatment, as well as strengthen the 
therapeutic alliance between the therapist and the narcissistic patient generally. 
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              What the results of the present study offer specifically to better understanding 
the treatment of narcissism is insight into experiences that are particular to the vulnerable 
self-state. As argued previously, we conceptualize the association between vulnerable 
narcissism and increased cognitive empathy for negative stimuli only on the MET as 
related in part to the contingent self-esteem inherent in vulnerable narcissism. If the 
vulnerable narcissist can better identify negative affect in the other, then he can protect 
against perennial threats to his self-esteem and general self-concept. The association 
between greater vulnerable narcissism and lower social desirability concerns similarly 
suggests that avoidance of feedback from another person in vulnerability represents an 
attempt to bolster and shore up lower self-esteem. This is supported by theories that 
propose avoidance of social relationships in vulnerable narcissism represents an attempt 
to reduce social rejection risk (Ronningstam, 2011). If a clinician is cognizant of this 
aspect of the narcissistic patient’s experience—his tendency to seek out confirmation or 
disconfirmation in the other of his own fragile self-concept—then the clinician may better 
navigate the common counter-transferential response to narcissistic patients of avoiding 
interpretations of narcissistic defenses for fear of harming the narcissist’s fragile and 
precarious self-esteem. For example, in the previous example, a narcissistic patient may 
consider himself to be more empathic than his spouse, and this assertion may be a 
defensive attempt not to examine his own inability to mentalize the experiences of those 
closest to him. If the therapist is invested in the treatment and thus feels empathy herself 
for the patient, then she will understandably feel some trepidation at showing him how 
his own self-centeredness detrimentally affects his relationships. However, the therapist 
does this patient a disservice if she avoids interpreting the patient’s inability to mentalize 
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his loved ones for fear of damaging his self-esteem. If both therapist and patient can 
survive the process of challenging a narcissistic patient by confronting them with social 
realities (e.g., a bitterly disappointed spouse) and their proclivity to avoid such realities, 
treatment goals can pivot to developing self-esteem that is not primarily contingent on the 
recognition of others (Tritt et al., 2009) and fostering insight into primary feelings of fear 
and shame (Ronningstam & Baskin-Sommers, 2013). Additionally, the hyperattunement 
of the narcissistic patient to negative affect in the other may serve as a useful tool in 
helping him to develop the broader ability to mentalize the experience of another 
person (Diamond et al., in press).  
5.8 Limitations and future directions 
  One of the main limitations of the present study is the use of non-clinical 
undergraduate students. The participants were not diagnosed with clinical or semi-
structured interviews for any clinical disorders such as NPD, and thus the results may not 
generalize to a clinical sample. It is also possible that some of our measure’s subscales did 
not emerge as having significant associations with other measures because the sample was 
non-clinical. For example, one of our performance-based measures (the MASC) was not 
associated with our self-report measure of narcissism, the PNI. The MASC was developed 
using a sample of individuals with Asperger syndrome (Dziobek et al., 2006), and has 
primarily been used to study clinical samples, including those who meet criteria for NPD 
and individuals with psychopathic traits (Ritter et al., 2011; Sharp et al., 2014). Thus, it is 
possible that a non-clinical sample such as the one used in the current study could not as 
easily tap into the cognitive empathy score of the MASC. However, it should be noted that 
there was a negative relationship between PNI pathological narcissism and cognitive 
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empathy on the MASC in the current sample that approached clinical significance. Future 
studies would benefit from employing the MASC with both the PNI and a diagnostic 
interview that could identify NPD patients so that the MASC cognitive empathy score’s 
relationship with narcissism can be explored. 
Additionally, it would be beneficial to use the PNI in a clinical sample so as to 
further clarify if the PNI captures more pathological manifestations of narcissism, as 
argued by Edershile et al. (2019); it is possible that unlike in the present study, the 
grandiosity subscale may have been associated with the study’s empathy measures if 
given to clinically diagnosed NPD participants. Employing clinical interviews conducted 
by mental health professionals allows for a more nuanced picture of a participant’s 
personality pathology, and thus research exploring similar aims to the present study could 
be improved by using both self-report and diagnostic interviews as indicators of 
pathology.  
Future longitudinal studies should also be used to explore causal effects between 
the PNI and both the MET and IRI, as the current cross-sectional study’s results cannot 
lay claims to causality. Longitudinal studies are also of particular interest in expanding 
upon the current study’s findings because they can examine the fluctuations between 
grandiosity and vulnerability that narcissistic patients and individuals commonly exhibit 
(Gore & Widiger, 2016; Roche, Pincus, Conroy, Hyde, & Ram, 2013; Ronningstam, 
2009), which cannot be measured by self-report. In a recent study by Wright et al. (2017), 
psychiatric outpatients who met NPD criteria completed a 21-day ecological momentary 
assessment (EMA) protocol using smartphones in order to measure participants’ reported 
perceptions of interactions with their partners. It was found that narcissistic vulnerability 
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was most prevalent when participants felt challenged or controlled. This study was able to 
assess how narcissism is related to specific behaviors triggered by interpersonal and 
affective processes, and serves as a model for how future studies examining empathy 
deficits in narcissism may be developed. EMA protocols could allow researchers to 
identify whether a vulnerable versus grandiose self-state affects empathic abilities in a 
moment-to-moment interaction, which may offer more insight into what is behind 
empathy deficits in narcissism than performance-based measures of empathy can provide. 
5.9 Conclusion  
This is the first study to examine the relationship between empathy and narcissism 
using the two performance-based tasks of empathy, the MASC and MET, in an 
undergraduate sample. It is also the first study to the authors’ knowledge that looks 
directly at differences in empathy on these performance-based tasks between two 
expressions of narcissism, vulnerability and grandiosity. We did not find that better 
cognitive and poorer affective empathy on both the performance-based tasks and the self-
report, the IRI, were associated with PNI narcissism. Instead, we found that poorer 
cognitive empathy on the IRI and better cognitive empathy on the MET for negative 
emotional faces was associated with PNI vulnerability. Additionally, we found that PNI 
vulnerability was uniquely related to a performance-based task of empathy, the MET for 
negative emotional faces, rather than to the self-report, the IRI when controlling for social 
desirability. However, contrary to expected, it was lower (as opposed to higher) social 
desirability that accounted for the variance in vulnerable narcissism explained by lower 
cognitive empathy on the self report, the IRI. 
Our hypotheses were based in prior research on the relationship between 
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narcissism and empathy that shows narcissism to be associated with deficient affective 
and better, comparable or dysfunctional cognitive empathy compared to healthy controls 
(Di Pierro, Di Sarno, Preti, Di Mattei, & Madeddu, 2018; Baskin-Sommers, Krusemark, & 
Ronningstam, 2014). We were also informed by studies that show how narcissistic 
participants over-report empathic abilities but display compromised empathy on tasks 
within the same study (Marissen, Deen, & Franken, 2012; Czarna, Wróbel, Dufner, and 
Zeigler-Hill, 2015). The clinical picture of a narcissistic individual that emerges from our 
study’s hypotheses is one who is concerned with having socially desirable traits, and who 
fails to affectively resonate with others but can cognitively empathize for potentially 
nefarious purposes such as manipulation; this clinical portrait is one that is often 
referenced in literature on the Dark Tetrad personality traits, which include 
Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy, and sadism (Turner, Foster, & Webster, 2019; 
Pajevicc, Vukosavljevic-Gvozden, Stevanovic, & Neumann, 2018; Pfabgian et al., 2015). 
It is also a conceptualization that shares more with the current criteria for NPD in the 
DSM-5 (DSM-5; APA, 2013): the NPD patient “requires excessive admiration,” “is 
interpersonally exploitative,” and “lacks empathy or is unwilling to recognize or identify 
with the feelings and needs of others.” 
In contrast to that of our study’s hypotheses, the clinical picture of narcissism that 
emerges from our results is one that, rather than conforming only to a more grandiose 
presentation, is characterized by grandiose and vulnerable features, and aligns with 
psychoanalytically-informed theories on the etiology of the disorder. Our finding that 
vulnerable narcissism was associated with better cognitive empathy on the MET for 
negative emotional faces is consistent with prior research on the topic showing an 
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enhanced ability in narcissism to read negativity in faces (Panfilis et al., 2019; Wai & 
Tiliopoulos, 2012), and provides empirical support for theories that highlight how 
narcissistic vulnerability is driven by efforts to protect a sense of self crippled by 
contingent self-esteem (Ronningstam, 2011). The finding also clarifies how, as posited in 
the current research on mentalization, those with narcissistic disorders fail to adequately 
understand the mind of another person because their capacity to read another’s affect is 
bound up in their general mistrust of social communication, and that this mistrust 
(engendered by inconsistent parenting) motivates a hyperattunement to the needs and 
approval of others (Diamond et al., in press). The narcissistic patient thus recognizes 
affect in the other as a means of ensuring that they do not represent a psychic threat; this 
recognition serves the purpose only of assessing whether the narcissistic patient’s 
precarious sense of self is either accepted or rejected. 
Our finding that lower self-reported social desirability accounted for the 
association between vulnerable narcissism and lower self-reported cognitive empathy, in 
addition to supporting prior research on narcissism and social desirability (Barry, Lui, & 
Anderson, 2017; Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991), further enriches the conceptualization 
of vulnerable narcissism underpinned by our MET finding. A lack of interest in 
impression management, which undergirds the lack of motivation to take another person’s 
perspective in narcissism, supports the theory that narcissism is characterized by attempts 
to protect a fragile ego; these attempts may take the form either of social avoidance 
generally (Ronningstam, 2011) or of avoiding empathic processes so as not to lose control 
or experience negative feelings (Di Pierro et al., 2018). We conceive of a lower interest in 
socially desirability as related both to a disengagement from social-emotional processes as 
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a means of ego protection, as well as part of a general pattern in narcissism to see the other 
not as a subject of their own, but rather an object that contains split-off, negative aspects 
of the self, and thus can be easily dismissed or denigrated. 
Taken together, our findings lend empirical support to a conceptualization of 
narcissism that is based less on outward behaviors and symptoms, and more on the 
dynamic shifts in interpersonal functioning and self-concept that we believe are 
characteristic of narcissistic disorders. Our findings also support the inclusion of the 
vulnerable presentation in the DSM-5’s Alternative Model for Personality Disorders 
(AMPD) of NPD. The AMPD offers a more specific description of impaired empathy in 
narcissism that includes the excessive attunement “to reactions of others, but only if 
perceived as relevant to self.” This more fine-tuned understanding of empathy deficits in 
NPD incorporates what aspects of the vulnerable presentation may specifically affect the 
ability to empathize. Additionally, it is our hope that lack of empathy can be understood 
not only as a feature of the narcissistic phenotype, but also as related to the unconscious 
processes that constitute the disorder’s intrapsychic landscape. A better understanding of 
these processes can pave a clearer path towards more targeted treatment of both NPD and 















                                                
1 Of the 20 students who indicated “Response not above” when selecting their race, 5 did 
not write in a race and 15 wrote in the following responses: Hispanic, Middle Eastern, 
Dominican, South Asian, Central American, and Mexican 
Table 1             
Descriptive characteristics of the demographics (N = 89)    
Variable          N % 
Gender Identity           
Female         58 65.2 
Male         30 33.7 
Non-binary         1 1.1 
Race             
American Indian or Alaskan Native         2 2.2 
Asian     32 36.0 
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander         1 1.1 
Black or African American     15 16.9 
White       10 11.2 
More than one race     9 10.1 
Race not listed or indicated1   20 22.5 
Ethnicity             
Hispanic/Latino/Latina/Latinx   35 39.3 
Not Hispanic/Latino/Latina/Latinx   54 60.7 
Sexual Orientation           
Straight       74 83.1 
Gay         3 3.4 
Bisexual       9 10.1 
Queer         1 1.1 
Sexual orientation not listed     2 2.2 
Household Income (annual, USD)       
<10,000       13 14.6 
10,000 - 14,999       10 11.2 
15,000 - 24,999       22 24.7 
25,000 - 34,999       11 12.4 
35,000 - 49,999       8 9 
50,000 - 74,999       8 9 
75,000 - 99,999       8 9 
Greater than 99,999     9 10.1 





   	 	 	Pathological Narcissism Inventory (N = 89)      
	 	 	





       
Pathological Narcissism Inventory (PNI) Pathological 
Narcissism 2.60 .64 .96 - 3.85 
Pathological Narcissism Inventory (PNI) Vulnerability 2.33 .88 .33 - 4.15 
Pathological Narcissism Inventory (PNI) Grandiosity 2.86 .65 1.20 - 4.90 
 
Table 2.1 
Performance-based empathy measures (N = 89) 
    Mean SD Range 
Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC) 
Cognitive Empathy 33.50 3.45 26 - 42 
Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET) Cognitive Empathy .62 .10 .41 - .84 
Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET) Cognitive Empathy Positive .67 .12 .42 - .92 
Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET) Cognitive Empathy Negative .57 .11 .29 - .82 
Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET) Affective Empathy 5.42 1.20 1.50 - 7.73 
Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET) Affective Empathy Positive 5.35 1.63 1.00 - 8.21 
Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET) Affective Empathy Negative 5.53 1.78 1.14 - 8.36 
 
Table 2.2 
Self-report empathy measure (N = 89)     
  Mean SD Range 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index Perspective-taking   20.33 4.09 10 – 28 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index Empathic Concern   20.58 4.54 8 – 28 
 
Table 2.3 
Clinical self-report measures and age (N = 89)       
    Mean SD Range 
SCID-II Questionnaire BPD symptoms       28.97 7.33 16 - 53 
Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression 
Scale (CES-D)       16.33 8.28 4 - 36 
Psychiatric Symptoms (BSI)     29.96 33.1 0 - 126 
Social Desirability (MCSDS)   18.44 5.63 6 - 31 











Table 3           
Correlations among empathy 
measures (N = 89) 
 



















Empathy -----         
MET 
Cognitive 
Empathy .29** -----       
MET 
Affective 
Empathy .03 -.12 -----     
IRI 
Perspective-
taking .22* .26* .16 -----   
IRI Empathic 
Concern .31** .17 .09 .44** ----- 
Note. MASC = Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition; MET = Multifaceted 
Empathy Test; IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index; IRI Perspective-taking approximates 
cognitive empathy; IRI Empathic Concern approximates affective 
empathy         




Table 4       








MASC Cognitive Empathy -.10 -.16 -.19 
MET Cognitive Empathy .12 .15 .19 
MET Cognitive Empathy 
Positive .10 .01 .06 
MET Cognitive Empathy 
Negative .17 .24* .25* 
MET Affective Empathy .04 -.05 -.03 
MET Affective Empathy 
Positive .14 -.09 -.01 
MET Affective Empathy 
Negative -.09 .02 -.03 
IRI Perspective-taking .19 -.33** -.20 
IRI Empathic Concern .16 -.17 -.08 
Note. 
a Correlations of PNI Grandiosity with all the empathy measures are controlled for PNI 
Vulnerability (Crowe et al., 2019) 
* p < .05.            ** p <.01.               
 
Table 5       
Hierarchical Regression Predicting Vulnerability from IRI perspective-taking and MET 





 Model 1 Model 2 
 B β B β 
Constant 2.59  3.70  
 MET CE Negative 2.56        .326*** 1.52 .194* 
 IRI Perspective-taking -.084       -.389*** -.026 -.118 
 MCSDS Scores   -.094 -.599*** 
     
R2 .206  .488  
F 11.02***  26.70***  
ΔR2   .282  
     
Note. IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index; MCSDS = Marlowe–Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale 






Table 6       
Hierarchical Regression Predicting Pathological Narcissism from MET Cognitive Empathy 
for Negative Pictures Controlling for Gender, BSI scores, CESD scores, and BPD symptoms 





 Model 1 Model 2 
 B β B β 
Constant 1.81  1.34  
 MET CE Negative 1.31 .244* 1.18 .220* 
 Gender   .024 .019 
 BSI Scores   .007 .358* 
 CESD Scores   .007 .084 
 BPD Symptoms   .007 .475 
     
R2 .060  .285  
F 4.31*  5.10***  
ΔR2   .225***  
 


















Table 7       
Hierarchical Regression Predicting Vulnerability from MET Cognitive Empathy for 
Negative Pictures, Controlling for Gender, BSI scores, CESD scores, and BPD 





 Model 1 Model 2 
 B β B β 
Constant 1.28  .227  
  MET CE Negative 1.75 .229* 1.44 .188* 
  Gender   .143 .078 
  BSI Scores   .014 .532*** 
  CESD Scores   .008 .068 
  BPD Symptoms   .016 .136 
     
R2 .052  .473  
F 3.75*  11.50 ***  
ΔR2   .421  
Note. IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
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